REVITALIZING SELECTIVE WAIVER:
ENCOURAGING VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE
WRONGDOING BY RESTRICTING THIRD PARTY ACCESS TO
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The recent plague of white-collar scandals has shed light on the
ugly phenomenon that many of the most trusted names in Corporate
America have not been playing fair. Although the Enron and
WorldCom collapses have captured most of the media spotlight,
1
countless other corporations are currently under investigation.
While Americans were wary of corporate power before these
2
scandals, such headlines have further ingrained a strong distrust for
3
corporate leadership into the collective American psyche. For better
or for worse, however, large corporations constitute the backbone of
4
the nation’s economy, and workers, investors, and consumers alike
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1
Taking into consideration the activities of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) alone, some have suggested that “based on recent history,
approximately 30% of listed companies will be contacted by the SEC Division of
Enforcement sometime in the next two years.” Association of Corporate Counsel,
SEC
Investigations,
available
at
http://www.acca.com/networks/webcast/
sec_investigation.php (last visited Oct. 5, 2004).
2
See Aaron Bernstein, Too Much Corporate Power?, BUS. WK., Sept. 11, 2000, at
144. Poll results released on August 31, 2000, long before the Enron, WorldCom,
and similar scandals broke, suggested that “nearly three-quarters of Americans
believe that business has gained too much power.” Id.
3
See John Gibeaut, Softening Up Client ‘Appeal’: Some Corporations Need to Put on a
Human Face When Coming Before a Jury, 89 A.B.A. J. 28, 28 (2003) (noting that “in an
Enron-inspired climate, it’s almost a yawner when each new poll shows that distrust
for corporate America has reached an all-time high.”). Id.
4
See Charles Gray, Corporate Goliaths: Sizing Up Corporations and Governments,
MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, June 1, 1999, at 26.
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suffer when corporate insiders manipulate the system. Our nation’s
political leaders, despite their seemingly all-too-cozy relationships
6
with many of those responsible for such transgressions, have now
finally decided that measures must be taken to combat the cauldron
7
of white-collar crime brewing within America’s corporations. While
8
the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act constitutes a laudable first
effort, many are dubious that this law will significantly limit corporate
9
malfeasance. This Comment advocates that the selective waiver
10
doctrine serves to complement recent attempts to rein in such
criminal activity, for it aligns corporations’ interests in maintaining
crime-free operations and the government’s interest in ensuring that
5

Greenhouse Emitters Act on Climate Change, ENERGY, June 22, 2003, at 21
(observing that “[r]ecent corporate scandals point to the high price paid by
everyone . . . for inadequate corporate governance practices.”) (quoting Mindy
Lubber, Executive Director of Ceres, Press Statement, July 9, 2003).
6
See, e.g., Editorial Desk, Governor Rowland Should Resign, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14,
2004, at A18 (noting the Connecticut Governor’s admission to taking bribes from
local businessmen to secure favorable government contracts); William M. Welch,
Democrats Begin Fight to Replace Torricelli, U.S.A. TODAY, Oct. 2, 2002, at 14A (noting
accusations that the New Jersey Senator took bribes from a businessman in exchange
for his potential influence in business dealings).
7
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
8
Id. While meant to serve many ends, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is generally
intended to “protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of [public]
corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes.”
Id. The SEC had proposed a rule permitting selective waiver as part of the SarbanesOxley Act, but later withdrew that proposal. See Implementation of Standards of
Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6312 (Feb. 6, 2003)
[hereinafter Implementation].
9
See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered
Boards: Further Findings and a Reply to Symposium Participants, 55 STAN. L. REV. 885
(2002) (observing that “[t]he Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the revised NYSE listing
guidelines may represent only modest and possibly insufficient steps to improve
corporate governance more generally.”). Id. at 901.
10
Selective waiver is also often referred to as “limited waiver,” especially in older
works. See, e.g., Beth S. Dorris, Note, The Limited Waiver Rule: Creation of an SECCorporation Privilege, 36 STAN. L. REV. 789, 823 (1984). The term limited waiver,
however, “refers to two distinct types of waivers: selective and partial.” Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1423 n.7 (3d Cir. 1991).
“Selective waiver permits the client who has disclosed privileged communications to
one party to continue asserting the privilege against other parties. Partial waiver
permits a client who has disclosed a portion of privileged communications to
continue asserting the privilege as to the remaining portions of the same
communications.” Id. (citing Breckinridge L. Willcox, Martin Marietta and Erosion of
the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work-Product Protection, 49 MD. L. REV. 917, 922
(1990); Developments in the Law – Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450,
1630-31 (1985) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]). This Comment will use the
term selective waiver except when quoting a source.
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applicable laws are followed.
A corporation that suspects criminal wrongdoing within its ranks
11
inevitably faces a difficult decision. It can hire outside counsel to
conduct an internal investigation into the matter, and subsequently
disclose any relevant findings to the appropriate government
12
agency. Alternatively, the corporation may elect to make no
13
disclosures whatsoever. Full disclosure benefits the public at large,
because, among other advantages, it enables the government to take
14
steps to cure whatever malfeasance has occurred. Since criminal
15
liability can attach to the corporation itself for the acts of its agents,
however, the corporation may have much to lose from admitting its
own guilt. Therefore, in order to induce corporations to disclose
evidence of criminal activity, government agencies typically offer
16
more lenient punishments than would otherwise be imposed.
Because corporate misconduct often not only violates criminal
laws, but injures third parties as well, it may give rise to significant
17
civil liability.
In most jurisdictions, a corporation’s disclosure of
sensitive materials to a government agency constitutes a complete
18
waiver of the otherwise applicable privileges. A corporation’s initial
11

Nancy Horton Burke, The Price of Cooperating with the Government: Possible Waiver
of Attorney-Client and Work Product Privileges, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 33, 34 (1997).
12
Richard M. Strassberg & Sarah E. Walters, Is Selective Waiver of Privilege Viable?
Counsel Face Hobson’s Choice When Asked to Cooperate With Government, N.Y. L.J., July 7,
2003, at 7.
13
Id.
14
See Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1425. The court noted, “[w]e do not question the
importance of the public interest in voluntary cooperation with government
investigations.” Id.
15
New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 492-93
(1909) (recognizing that a corporation can be held criminally liable for the criminal
conduct of its agents, where such illegal acts are committed within an agent’s scope
of employment).
16
See Strassberg & Walters, supra note 12, at 7; See also Internal Corporate
Investigations: The Dilemma Presented in Considering Whether to Share Investigation Results
with the SEC or the Justice Department, 35 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1170 (July 14,
2003) (noting that “corporate cooperation, disclosure of the complete results of [a
corporate] internal investigation, and a willingness to waive attorney-client and workproduct protection [are] factors which a prosecutor could consider in determining
whether to charge a corporation.”); Department of Justice, Corporate Leniency Policy,
(Aug. 10, 1993) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.pdf.
17
See Strassberg & Walters, supra note 12, at 7.
18
See, e.g., In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293
F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681 (1st Cir.
1997); Genentech Inc. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 122 F.3d 1409 (Fed. Cir.
1997); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414 (3d
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disclosure of otherwise privileged materials to the government,
according to most courts, waives those privileges as to all other
parties; thus, civil litigants seeking to sue the corporation will typically
19
be granted unfettered access to the disclosed materials.
Even
confidentiality arrangements between the disclosing corporation and
the government agency are seldom sufficient to permit the successful
assertion of privilege against a civil plaintiff if a previous disclosure
20
was made.
Thus, a corporation’s initial disclosure to the
government provides non-government civil litigants with damaging
evidence that can be used against the corporation in a suit for
21
damages.
In essence, disclosures to government agencies equip
private litigants with “a virtual road map to assist them in their
22
lawsuit.” Given that the benefits to be derived from lenient criminal
punishment are often insignificant when compared to the potential
civil liability at stake, corporations aware of their own improprieties
23
often decline to make any disclosures to the government.
The selective waiver doctrine encourages corporate cooperation
with government investigations, by permitting corporations to retain
applicable privileges in subsequent private litigation despite initial
24
disclosures to the government.
Facilitating disclosure allows law
enforcement agencies to levy criminal penalties against the individual
25
In
perpetrators of the harm, as well as the corporation itself.
addition, selective waiver reduces the costs associated with
26
investigating criminal activity, and encourages corporations to
Cir. 1991); In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1988); Permian Corp.
v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (all suggesting or concluding that a
waiver of privileges to one party is typically a waiver to all parties).
19
See id.
20
See, e.g., Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1427 (finding a complete waiver despite a
confidentiality agreement to the contrary between the disclosing corporation and a
government agency). But see In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2d Cir.
1993) (holding that in certain situations, a confidentiality agreement could prevent
the complete waiver of all privileges despite an initial disclosure to a government
agency).
21
See Strassberg & Walters, supra note 12, at 7.
22
Id.
23
See David M. Greenwald & Matthew J. Thomas, Selective Waiver of Privileges, FOR
THE DEFENSE, Dec. 2002, at 10-11.
24
See id.
25
See Strassberg & Walters, supra note 12, at 7.
26
See Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 303. The Sixth Circuit, despite its eventual
rejection of the doctrine, observed that “[t]here is considerable appeal, and
justification, for permitting selective waiver . . . . Considerable savings are realized to
the [g]overnment, and through it to the public, in time and fiscal expenditure
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enhance their internal compliance efforts, thereby preventing future
27
misconduct.
Despite these apparent advantages, selective waiver has been
28
repeatedly condemned by both courts and commentators alike.
29
Only one federal circuit has adopted the doctrine, and only in
30
The doctrine’s critics charge that selective waiver
limited form.
31
places private litigants at a distinct disadvantage, and that the ends
served by selective waiver, although laudable, are inconsistent with
the goals of the attorney-client privilege and the work-product
32
protection.
This Comment argues that permitting a corporation to waive
privileges as to the government, yet retain them against other private
33
litigants, rarely serves to disadvantage private litigants.
Furthermore, this Comment demonstrates that the general policies
supporting existing privileges, and the benefits that could be derived
related to the investigation of crimes and civil fraud.” Id.
27
See id. The court further noted, “[s]uch a policy might also . . . increase the
likelihood that corporations would engage in . . . self-policing . . . .” Id; see also Daniel
L. Goelzer & Clifford E. Kirsch, The Doctrine of Selective Waiver or Self Destruction?, 6 NO.
8 INSIGHTS 11, 14 (1992); Janet L. Hall, Note, “Limited Waiver” of Protection Afforded by
the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work-Product Doctrine, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 981, 996
(1993).
28
See cases cited supra note 18. See also Dorris, supra note 10, at 823; Jill A.
Hornstein, Comment, Paying the “Traditional Price” of Disclosure: The Third Circuit
Rejects Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 467, 479-80
(1993); Alec Koch, Note, Internal Corporate Investigations: The Waiver of Attorney-Client
Privilege and Work-Product Protection Through Voluntary Disclosures to the Government, 34
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 347, 374 (1997); Comment, Stuffing the Rabbit Back into the Hat:
Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege in an Administrative Agency Investigation, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 1198, 1228 (1982) [hereinafter Rabbit].
29
See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 599-600 (8th Cir. 1977)
(en banc) (recognizing selective waiver with regard to the attorney-client privilege).
30
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. EEOC, 922 F. Supp. 235, 237 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(rejecting selective waiver’s applicability to the work-product protection); see also infra
notes 140, 277.
31
See, e.g., Permian, 665 F.2d at 1222 (positing that “[i]t is apparent that [selective
waiver] would enable litigants to pick and choose among [its opponents] . . . . [A]
litigant who wishes to assert confidentiality must maintain genuine confidentiality.”);
Rabbit, supra note 28, at 1218-19 (arguing that “[w]ithin the limits of legislative
authorization, the judicial system should not discriminate between private parties
and government agencies; justice demands that all litigants be treated by the same
rules.”).
32
See, e.g., Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1425-29 (observing that the goals of selective
waiver are inconsistent with the underlying purposes of the attorney-client privilege
and work-product protection).
33
See infra notes 230-247 and accompanying text.
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from a selective waiver rule, invite widespread recognition of this
34
doctrine in the form of a new corporation-government privilege.
This Comment advocates the adoption of a modified selective
35
waiver doctrine. Part I of this Comment addresses the purposes of
the attorney-client privilege and the work-product protection, and
their relevance in the corporate context. Part II examines the
current state of the selective waiver doctrine, and courts’ analyses of
its prospects and pitfalls. Part III explores the policy arguments
surrounding adoption or rejection of the doctrine, the
recommended scope of the privilege, and how it can reasonably be
implemented. Finally, Part IV concludes that Congress should
implement a selective waiver rule in the form of a new corporationgovernment privilege, as such a policy would help to align corporate
and government interests, and, in the long run, reduce criminal
activity within American corporations.
I.

Background

A. The Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege protects communications between
36
attorney and client from discovery.
It is the oldest of all the
37
testimonial privileges, arising in Elizabethan times. The privilege is
intended to “encourage full and frank communication between
attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public
38
interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.”
Without the privilege, a “client would be reluctant to confide in his
lawyer and it would be difficult to obtain fully informed legal
34

See infra notes 293-300 and accompanying text. Just as the attorney-client
privilege and work-product protection provide real, although generally
unquantifiable benefits, this Comment contends that a new corporation-government
privilege would provide significant, although similarly unquantifiable benefits, at
limited costs. Id.
35
See id. Diversified held selective waiver to be applicable generally, that is, even
in the absence of a confidentiality agreement with the investigating government
agency. Diversified, 572 F.2d at 599-600. This Comment advocates that selective
waiver should only be applicable in cases where an agreement concerning the
confidentiality of the materials disclosed is reached between the disclosing
corporation and the government agency. See infra notes 349-350 and accompanying
text.
36
See EDNA SALAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORKPRODUCT DOCTRINE 2 (4th ed. 2001).
37
See id.
38
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
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40

advice.”
While originally a judicial creation, the attorney-client
41
privilege has been codified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
By its nature, the attorney-client privilege inhibits the truth
42
finding process, and therefore courts strive to confine the privilege
43
to its “narrowest possible limits” while still maintaining its purpose.
The attorney-client privilege, like all privileges, serves as an exception
to the general rule that the public “has a right to every man’s
44
evidence.”
The attorney-client privilege itself has been often
criticized because its burdens (restricted availability of evidence and
increased discovery costs) are said to be “plain and concrete” while its
benefits (promoting the accessibility to informed legal advice) have
45
Although the
been referred to as “indirect and speculative.”
advantages of the privilege are admittedly unquantifiable, the
attorney-client privilege has nevertheless become a cornerstone of
the Anglo-American legal system, referred to as one of the “bastions
46
of an ordered liberty.”
Because of this narrow interpretation, the attorney-client
privilege is extremely fragile and can be lost through purposeful or
inadvertent disclosure of otherwise privileged information to other
47
parties.
Since confidentiality is a fundamental element of the
attorney-client privilege, a confidentiality breach is typically deemed a
waiver of the privilege, and therefore the protections it affords are
48
lost. “The waiver rule serves to ensure that the privilege, with its
49
attendant costs to the judicial system, is ‘strictly confined . . . .’”
Virtually any disclosure to others constitutes a waiver of the attorney50
client privilege, except when the party to whom the information is
disclosed shares a common interest in the litigation with the
39

Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
41
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
42
See Jaffe v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996).
43
In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 1973) (quoting WIGMORE, supra note
40, § 2291).
44
WIGMORE, supra note 40, § 2192.
45
NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 907 (quoting WIGMORE, supra note 40, § 2291).
46
See EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 2.
47
See EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 292-391.
48
See 1 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, § 91, at 187-88 (Cleary ed. 1972).
49
Rabbit, supra note 28, at 1207 (quoting WIGMORE, supra note 40, § 2291).
50
See In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 130 F.R.D. 560, 570-71 (E.D. Pa. 1989). The
common interest exception protects communications disclosed to another party
sharing a common interest with the party asserting the privilege. Id.
40
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51

disclosing party.
Courts seek to ensure “fairness” to all interested parties, in that
when a certain point of disclosure is reached, or when disclosures are
made to certain parties but not others, “fairness requires that [the
attorney-client] privilege shall cease whether . . . that result [was
52
53
intended] or not.” Many contend that such “limited” disclosures
transforms the privilege from a “shield” to a “sword,” such that the
54
privilege becomes an offensive “brush on the attorney’s palette,”
instead of a defensive mechanism to protect confidential
55
communications. In essence, a client cannot assert the attorneyclient privilege over certain communications in one context, while
not maintaining the confidentiality of those communications in
56
others.
Although courts seek to restrict the scope of the attorney-client
57
privilege to its “narrowest possible limits,” permitting a “selective
waiver” in limited circumstances may help achieve valuable public
58
policy goals.
Dismissing the potential benefits that could be
garnered by permitting selective waiver of the attorney-client
51

See In re Perrigo Co., 128 F.3d 430, 441 n.9 (6th Cir. 1997). The court
observed, “under normal circumstances, waiver as to one party should be waiver as to
all.” Id.
52
WIGMORE, supra note 40, § 2291.
53
The “fairness” argument has been summed up as follows:
Generally, the fairness argument has been applied in the form of the
‘subject matter’ waiver rule: once a client has disclosed part of a
privileged communication, the privilege is deemed waived as to all
related communications. To allow clients to choose to reveal only
certain parts of a communication—presumably, those parts most
favorable to their cause—would be to convert the privilege from a
‘shield’ to a ‘sword’. . . to paint a ‘misleadingly one-sided’ picture of
the facts.
Rabbit, supra note 28, at 1208 (internal citations omitted).
54
Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 306-07. The Sixth Circuit similarly held that a
party’s disclosure of privileged materials to a government agency, but not to other
parties, resulted in an offensive, or sword-like use of the privilege, as opposed to the
intended defensive, shield-like use of the privilege. Id.
55
See Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am. v. Shamrock Broad. Co., 521 F. Supp.
638, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
56
See In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
57
Horowitz, 482 F.2d at 81 (quoting WIGMORE, supra note 40, § 2291).
58
See infra Part III. Part III discusses the various public policy aims that would be
advanced by embracing the selective waiver doctrine. See also Hall, supra note 27, at
994-1000 (advocating an adoption of selective waiver and discussing its benefits);
Rabbit, supra note 28, at 1223-25 (discussing the arguments in favor of selective
waiver, but ultimately rejecting its application).

2005

COMMENT

831

privilege, merely because they do not readily lend themselves to
demonstration by empirical analysis, would invite a complete
abandonment of the privilege itself, as its benefits are only
“speculative.” In addition, confining the waiver doctrine within its
traditional boundaries, and thereby refusing to consider viable
alternatives entailing substantial societal gains, makes the law
59
stagnant and unresponsive to the nature of the modern world.
B. The Work-Product Protection
Like the attorney-client privilege, the work-product protection
arises from the assumption that an attorney cannot provide full and
frank advice to his client, and likewise cannot effectively represent his
client, without the expectation that sensitive and potentially
60
damaging information will be kept from his client’s adversaries.
61
First recognized by the United States Supreme Court in 1947, the
protection has since been codified within the Federal Rules of Civil
62
Just as the attorney-client privilege has become an
Procedure.
accepted aspect of the American legal system, so too has the work63
product protection.
The work-product doctrine generally protects “documents and
tangible things, prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial, by
64
or for another party, or by or for that other party’s representative.”
Because it protects an attorney’s “mental impressions, conclusions,
65
opinions, or legal theories,” the work-product doctrine has been
recognized as necessary to maintain the proper operation of the
66
67
adversarial system.
This “privilege,” although broader in scope
68
than the attorney-client privilege, is unlike the attorney-client
69
The work-product doctrine
privilege in that it is not absolute.
59

See infra notes 82-102 and accompanying text (discussing the uniqueness of the
corporation, and its reliance upon its agents for its survival).
60
See EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 477.
61
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947).
62
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
63
See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 36.
64
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
65
Id.
66
John E. Tyler III, Analyzing New Protections For Intangible Work Product and
Harmonizing That Protection with the Use of Privilege Logs, 64 UMKC L. REV. 743, 757
(1996).
67
See infra note 70.
68
See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 n.11 (1975).
69
See EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 549.
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affords parties only a “qualified” protection, where certain materials
deemed work product may indeed be discoverable by an opposing
70
party.
Opinion work product, work product containing an
attorney’s opinions, mental impressions, strategies, etc., is virtually
71
never discoverable. Conversely, fact work product, encompassing
72
“all other work product,” is discoverable upon a showing of
73
substantial need and undue hardship. The work-product doctrine
embodies the collective understanding that adequate representation
can only be achieved when an attorney is free to prepare for litigation
without the specter of discovery looming over every word the attorney
74
chooses to memorialize.
Waiver of the work-product protection is treated similarly to
75
waiver of the attorney-client privilege. While waiver of the workproduct protection may not always occur by virtue of a disclosure to a
third-party, waiver will typically occur when a disclosure is made to a
76
party deemed to be an adversary. Once waiver occurs, parties in
subsequent litigation are permitted to discover materials that would
77
otherwise be protected if the waiver had not occurred.
The
common interest exception also applies to the waiver of the workproduct doctrine, in that the disclosure of privileged materials to a
party sharing a common interest with the party seeking the
70

See id. at 478. As observed by Professor Epstein, “[t]he words ‘doctrine,’
‘immunity,’ and privilege (among others) have been used in naming the protection
given work product. Some resist the use of the term ‘privilege’ [when describing the
work-product doctrine] because the protection is qualified, unlike the traditional
communications privileges.” Id. See also Charles W. Ehrhardt & Matthew D. Shultz,
Pulling Skeletons from the Closet: A Look into the Work-Product Doctrine as Applied to Expert
Witnesses, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 67, 90 n.104 (2003) (observing that “[a]lthough
work-product protection is often referred to as a privilege, it is in fact a qualified
immunity from disclosure rather than a statutory privilege such as the attorney-client
privilege.”).
71
See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 401. The Supreme Court determined, “such work
product [i.e., an attorney’s opinions and mental impressions] cannot be disclosed
simply on a showing of substantial need and inability to obtain the equivalent
without undue hardship.” Id.
72
Johnson v. Gmeinder, 191 F.R.D. 638, 644 n.5 (D. Kan. 2000).
73
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
74
See EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 477.
75
See id. at 478.
76
See Steinhardt, 9 F.3d at 234-35. The work-product disclosure to the SEC was
deemed to be a waiver as the SEC was held to stand in an adversarial position to the
disclosing party. Id. Determining whether or not such a disclosure should constitute
a full waiver, such that other parties may have access to the disclosed materials, lies at
the crux of this Comment.
77
See Greenwald & Thomas, supra note 23, at 11.
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78

protection will not constitute a waiver.
Since the work-product protection also impedes the truthfinding process, courts have been apt to find waiver of the protection
even in cases of inadvertent disclosure, and seek to construe the
79
work-product doctrine narrowly. The primary benefit of the work80
product doctrine, preserving the integrity of the adversarial system,
81
has been correspondingly criticized as speculative and amorphous.
The question thus becomes whether expanding the narrow scope of
the work-product doctrine, by permitting a selective waiver of the
work-product protection, is justified when there is a realistic prospect
of advancing certain valued public policy aims.
C. The Nature of the Corporation and Privilege
While corporations are considered legal “persons” in their own
82
right, this is merely a legal fiction. Corporations are unable to act
on their own behalf, and instead they must rely upon their agents
83
and employees.
Unlike individuals, corporations lack states of
84
mind, and therefore “they cannot simply choose to obey the law.”
Rather, corporations, particularly larger ones, “must implement
85
programs that encourage legal compliance among their agents” and
conduct internal investigations to determine whether their agents
78

See United States v. AT&T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In AT&T,
both the government and MCI brought suit against AT&T on identical anti-trust
grounds. Id. MCI turned over certain confidential documents to the government to
assist in the litigation. Id. AT&T sought to acquire those documents in discovery,
arguing that MCI had waived its work-product protection over them by virtue of
disclosure to the government. Id. The D.C. Circuit, rejecting AT&T’s contention
that waiver had occurred, held that “[a] disclosure made in the pursuit of such
[common] trial preparation, and not inconsistent with maintaining secrecy against
opponents, should be allowed without waiver of the privilege.” Id. at 1299. See also,
Hall, supra note 27, at 988 (recognizing “work-product might be disclosed to a
nonadversary third party without undermining the purpose of the doctrine because
the disclosure still preserves the integrity of the adversarial process.”).
79
See, e.g., Suggs v. Whitaker, 152 F.R.D. 501, 505 (M.D.N.C. 1993) (holding that
“[b]ecause work-product protection by its nature may hinder an investigation into
the true facts, it should be narrowly construed consistent with its purpose.”).
80
See EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 477.
81
See Kathleen Waits, Opinion Work Product: A Critical Analysis of Current Law and a
New Analytical Framework, 73 OR. L. REV. 385, 452 (1994).
82
See Burnet v. Clark, 287 U.S. 410, 415 (1932).
83
New York Cent., 212 U.S. at 493.
84
John Calvin Conway, Note, Self-Evaluative Privilege and Corporate Compliance
Audits, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 621, 621 (1995).
85
Id.
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have committed unlawful acts.
If a corporation suspects unlawful conduct on the part of its
agents or employees, it will typically hire outside counsel to gather
the facts, assess the corporation’s potential liability, and make related
86
recommendations regarding how to proceed. These investigations
may consist of conducting interviews with employees, reviewing
documents, and subsequently submitting a report of the findings to
87
management.
88
Such investigations raise sensitive issues regarding privilege. In
89
Upjohn Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed the
difficulty of applying traditional notions of privilege to a modern,
90
multi-national corporation. The Upjohn Company (“Upjohn”), a
91
large drug manufacturer, retained counsel to investigate allegations
of bribery of foreign officials. In the course of that investigation,
counsel conducted interviews with various employees thought to have
92
knowledge of the circumstances. After being informed by counsel
of its findings, Upjohn submitted a report to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) disclosing its conclusion that certain
93
payments may have been in violation of applicable law. The SEC
subsequently issued a subpoena, intending to obtain documents
revealing the communications between the interviewed employees
and the attorneys, as well as the related interview notes and
94
memoranda drafted by those attorneys.
Rejecting the “control
group test,” the Court held that the communications between
counsel and corporate employees were privileged, even though the
employees at issue were not of the “highest authority”; that is, they
95
were not the decision-makers within the company. Furthermore,
the Court also determined that the aforementioned notes and
86

Id. at 621-24.
See, e.g., Diversified, 572 F.2d at 599-600; Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
88
See generally, Greenwald & Thomas, supra note 23, at 13.
89
449 U.S. 383 (1981).
90
See generally, Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
91
In 1995, Upjohn merged with Pharmacia AB, a Swedish pharmaceutical
company. Upjohn to Pfizer (Apr. 30, 2003), available at http://www.mlive.com
/business/kgazette/special/pfizer/200330430_pfizerkz18.html.
After another
merger in 2000, the consolidated corporation became known simply as Pharmacia
Corp. Id. In 2003, Pfizer Inc. acquired Pharmacia. Id.
92
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 387-88.
93
Id. at 388.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 383-84.
87
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memoranda were undiscoverable opinion work product.
Although Upjohn does not suggest that the Supreme Court would
readily adopt the selective waiver doctrine if given the opportunity,
the case does evince willingness on the part of the Court to reject the
narrowest possible construction of privilege under certain
97
circumstances. According to most circuit courts, a corporation that
voluntarily discloses privileged materials to the government, in
cooperation with a government investigation, loses the privilege over
those materials in subsequent litigation, even if the corporation
discloses those materials pursuant to a well-crafted confidentiality
98
agreement.
Regardless of the government’s promises that such
materials will be kept from third-party litigants, courts typically find
that, upon disclosing such materials to the government, applicable
99
privileges are waived.
Today’s corporations confronted with accusations of
100
wrongdoing therefore are said to face a “Hobson’s choice.” While
cooperation with the government will typically result in less stringent
punishment, such an advantage may be of relatively little importance
if cooperation eventually leads to third-party access to incriminating
evidence, which would be otherwise unavailable if the corporation
101
refused to cooperate.
Upjohn directly addressed the inherent
difficulty in applying privilege to corporations, which, despite the
legal fictions the law has created on their behalf, can only act by and
102
through their agents.
In the same vein, a reassessment of the
benefits that could be derived from aligning corporate and
government interests through selective waiver is in order, instead of a
96

Id. at 401.
See, e.g., Chad Bement, Note, Corporate Invention Records and the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 28 J. CORP. L. 317, 323 (2003) (observing that “[i]n Upjohn Co. v. United
States, the Supreme Court rejected the narrow control group test and considerably
expanded the scope the attorney-client privilege with regard to corporate
communications.”).
98
See, e.g., Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1420; Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 302.
99
See, e.g., Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1420; Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 302.
100
Strassberg & Walters, supra note 12, at 7. Technically, the term “Hobson’s
choice” refers not to a choice between two bad alternatives, although often used in
such a manner, but rather a “choice between taking either that which is offered or
nothing.”
WEBSTER’S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 909 (1996).
101
See Greenwald & Thomas, supra note 23, at 13.
102
See Thomas R. Mulroy and Eric J. Muñoz, The Internal Corporate Investigation, 1
BUS.
&
COMM.
DEPAUL
L.J. 49, 51 (2002).
97
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mere rejection of the selective waiver under traditional waiver
conceptions.
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Rise of Selective Waiver: Diversified Industries, Inc. v.
Meredith
Generally, the attorney-client privilege is deemed waived to all
parties if a privileged communication is disclosed to parties outside of
103
the attorney-client relationship. Similarly, the protections afforded
to work product are lost if such material is disclosed to an adversary
104
or potential adversary.
In essence, the “waiver rule” is said to
“ensure that . . . privilege[s] ‘[are] strictly confined within the
narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of [their]
105
principle[s].’”
During the late 1970s, however, a seemingly
progressive movement was afoot to carve out exceptions to these
106
traditional constructions of waiver.
At the time, the SEC had instituted a formal “Voluntary
Disclosure Program,” offering leniency in exchange for a
107
corporation’s cooperation with an SEC investigation.
Given the
government’s lack of resources to investigate and prosecute every
potential violation of relevant law, the program was seen as a good
108
way to ensure that more illegal practices would be halted.
Most
notably, the documents disclosed to the SEC in Upjohn were disclosed
109
pursuant to this program. While the Voluntary Disclosure Program
103

See Greenwald & Thomas, supra note 23, at 11.
See id.
105
Hornstein, supra note 28, at 472 (citing Rabbit, supra note 28, at 1208).
106
Greenwald & Thomas, supra note 23, at 10-11.
107
See Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Corporate Client: Where Do We Go After
Upjohn?, 81 MICH. L. REV. 665, 668 n.12 (1983). Instituted in 1976, the Voluntary
Disclosure Program was primarily designed to combat bribery of foreign officials by
American corporations who made such bribes in an effort to gain or retain business
in those foreign nations. See id. The ongoing practice of bribery led to the passage
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the next year. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2
(1977); see also DONALD CRUVER, COMPLYING WITH THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT: A GUIDE FOR U.S. FIRMS DOING BUSINESS IN THE INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE (2d
ed. 1999).
108
See Judson W. Starr & Nancy Voisin, Toward an Environmental Voluntary
Disclosure Program, 16 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 333, 340 (1991).
109
See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 388; Scott R. Flucke, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the
Corporate Setting: Counsel’s Dual Role as Attorney and Executive, 62 UMKC L. REV. 549,
554 (1994).
104
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is no longer employed in its original form, corporations are still
encouraged to voluntarily disclose information regarding potential
illegal activities in their midst, and are often punished less severely as
111
a result of their cooperation.
Out of this climate of promoting corporate self-policing and
112
voluntary disclosure arose the doctrine of selective waiver.
In
essence, selective waiver permits a corporation to disclose privileged
materials to certain parties, namely government agencies, while
113
retaining the privilege vis-à-vis other litigants.
Disclosures of
potentially illegal activities made by a corporation to a government
agency are typically of interest to third parties that seek to sue civilly
114
for injuries sustained due to such wrongdoing. Should such virtual
admissions of wrongdoing be made available to third parties, the
disclosing corporation, through its voluntary disclosure, would have
115
contributed to its own eventual failure in the subsequent suit.
As
mentioned, the potential advantages of leniency gained through
cooperation with the government often fail to outweigh the
disastrous consequences that would likely be incurred if third parties
116
were permitted to access the materials disclosed. In short, without
selective waiver, corporations are less inclined to make any voluntary
117
disclosures to the government.
118
In Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, Diversified Industries
(“Diversified”), a corporation engaged in the business of supplying
copper to brass manufacturers, found itself the target of a criminal
119
investigation.
As a result of a proxy fight among its shareholders,
information came to light that Diversified may have established a

110

See Dorris, supra note 10, at 796 n.36. Dorris notes that “[t]he SEC no longer
employs the [V]oluntary [D]isclosure [P]rogram to obtain information on
questionable payments [to foreign officials]; it now employs the program only to
obtain disclosures of misrepresentations and omissions in statements submitted
pursuant to the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts.” Id.
111
See Strassberg & Walters, supra note 12, at 7.
112
See Greenwald & Thomas, supra note 23, at 11.
113
See id.
114
See id. In certain instances, the “third party” seeking access to the disclosed
materials is another government agency, and not a private litigant. See, e.g., Mass.
Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 683; Permian, 665 F.2d at 1217.
115
See Greenwald & Thomas, supra note 23, at 12.
116
See id.
117
See id.
118
572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
119
Id. at 599-600.
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“slush fund” to pay bribes to the purchasing agents of Diversified’s
120
In exchange for agreeing to take a lower grade of
customers.
copper than contracted for, the purchasing agents of Diversified’s
121
customers were paid out of this “slush fund.”
Diversified retained
the services of a prominent law firm to conduct an internal
122
investigation in order to determine if such charges were legitimate.
The law firm interviewed many of Diversified’s employees, pored
through relevant documents, and eventually produced a
memorandum outlining its findings to Diversified’s Board of
123
Directors.
Unfortunately for Diversified, these allegations of corporate
124
bribery attracted the attention of the SEC.
Pursuant to its own
official investigation, the SEC filed a subpoena requesting the
125
memorandum prepared by the law firm.
Seeking leniency,
Diversified voluntarily turned over the memorandum and entered
126
into a consent decree with the SEC.
Diversified’s situation, however, worsened when it was sued by
one of its former customers, the Weatherhead Company
127
(“Weatherhead”), a brass manufacturer.
Weatherhead’s
purchasing agents were among those allegedly bribed by Diversified,
and as a result, Weatherhead was supplied with a low grade of
128
copper, although it paid for a higher grade. Weatherhead alleged
tortious interference with the contractual relationship between itself
and Diversified, unlawful conspiracy, and anti-trust violations, and
129
sought both actual and punitive damages.
In order to support its
allegations, Weatherhead requested the memorandum and
contended that Diversified waived the attorney-client privilege
130
through its voluntary disclosure of the memorandum to the SEC.
As the case was decided before Upjohn, much of the court’s
attention was focused upon the scope of the attorney-client privilege
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130

Id. at 600.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Diversified, 572 F.2d at 600.
Id.
Id. at 601.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Diversified, 572 F.2d at 600.
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with respect to the control group test and not the selective waiver
131
Almost off-handedly, however, the United States Court of
issue.
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit adopted selective waiver, observing
that “[t]o hold otherwise may have the effect of thwarting the
developing procedure of corporations to employ independent
outside counsel to investigate and advise them in order to protect
132
stockholders, potential stockholders and customers.”
The
Diversified court supported its decision to adopt selective waiver by
recognizing that the plaintiffs were in no way prohibited from
bringing their suit, and they were still free to obtain needed evidence
133
from “non-privileged” sources.
134
Since the Eighth Circuit’s adoption of selective waiver in 1977,
numerous corporate defendants have sought to rely on the selective
135
waiver theory, but with little success. The failure of selective waiver
to gain widespread approval has caused some commentators to
observe that the theory, as articulated in Diversified, is “essentially on
136
life support.”
The limited treatment of the doctrine by the
Diversified court has likely contributed to the theory’s inability to gain
137
much traction in other courts. While the corporation in Diversified
was successful in maintaining privilege over materials disclosed to the
138
SEC, the Eighth Circuit’s analysis of the selective waiver doctrine
was limited to a single paragraph, provided scant precedential
139
140
support, and has been widely criticized.
The Eighth Circuit
131

Id. at 600-10.
Id. at 611.
133
Id.
134
See id. Although finding its first judicial acceptance in Diversified, selective
waiver was first raised in court in 1973, in In re Penn. Cent. Commercial Paper Litig.,
61 F.R.D. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). In Penn Central, an attorney for a corporation under
investigation by the SEC, testified before an SEC hearing. Id. at 457. Subsequently,
the plaintiffs in a civil action sought the transcripts of the attorney’s testimony and
documents related thereto. Id. at 456. The corporation claimed that such
documents and transcripts were protected by the attorney-client privilege under the
selective waiver theory. Id. at 462. Rejecting selective waiver, the district court
observed that “[i]t is hornbook law that the voluntary disclosure or consent to
disclosure of a communication, otherwise subject to a claim of privilege, effectively
waives the privilege.” Id. at 463.
135
See cases cited supra note 18.
136
Greenwald & Thomas, supra note 23, at 11.
137
See id.
138
See Diversified, 572 F.2d at 611.
139
See id. The court cited Bucks County Bank & Trust Co. v. Storck, 297 F. Supp.
1122 (D. Haw. 1969) and United States v. Goodman, 289 F.2d 256 (4th Cir.), vacated on
other grounds, 368 U.S. 14 (1961), to support its adoption of selective waiver.
132
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remains the only federal jurisdiction that can be said to retain
141
selective waiver.
B. The Fall of Selective Waiver: Judicial Treatment of the Doctrine
Since Diversified
After Diversified, corporations readily began disclosing privileged
materials to the government pursuant to agency investigations,
seemingly expecting that they would still be able to assert the relevant
142
privileges over such materials as to private litigants if necessary. As
one commentator noted, over 425 corporations participated in the
SEC’s Voluntary Disclosure Program in 1979 (two years after the
Diversified decision), at a time when widespread adoption of the
143
Indeed, in 1981 a
selective waiver doctrine appeared feasible.
district court outside the Eighth Circuit held that a showing of an
intent to retain privilege over materials surrendered to a government
agency would permit the privilege to subsequently attach in future
Diversified, 572 F.2d at 611. Bucks County, however, dealt only with whether waiver of
the attorney-client privilege at a suppression hearing constituted a complete waiver.
Bucks County, 297 F. Supp. at 1123. Likewise, Goodman concerned the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and not the attorney-client
privilege. Goodman, 289 F.2d at 259. In essence, Diversified “borrowed” the analysis
from these cases, which permitted “selective waivers” in other contexts. See Diversified,
572 F.2d at 611.
140
See, e.g., Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221-22; Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1423-24
(criticizing Diversified). For a discussion of the scant treatment of the selective waiver
issue by the Diversified court, see Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 684; Koch, supra note
28, at 356; Rabbit, supra note 28, at 1211; Janice M. Symchych, Selective Waiver of
Attorney-Client Privilege: Although a 1978 8th Circuit Case Gave Corporations Reason to Hope
They Could Selectively Disclose Privileged and Work Product Information to the Government in
Confidence, Recent Developments Suggest Greater Caution is in Order, 60-OCT. BENCH & B.
MINN 17, 18 (2003).
141
See Diversified, 572 F.2d at 611; United States v. Shyres, 898 F.2d 647, 657 (8th
Cir. 1990) (determining that privilege remained despite production of documents to
a grand jury); McDonnell Douglas, 922 F. Supp. at 243 (noting the “[a]ttorney-client
privilege is generally waived by disclosure of . . . confidential communications to any
third parties, except in the limited waiver situation recognized in Diversified.”). The
Second Circuit has suggested, however, that it would consider permitting selective
waiver in cases where the parties enter into a valid confidentiality agreement. See
Steinhardt, 9 F.3d at 235; infra notes 184-190 and accompanying text.
142
See Greenwald & Thomas, supra note 23, at 12.
143
See Dorris, supra note 10, at 822. Dorris observed that “[i]n 1979, when only
one court had adopted the limited waiver rule, over 425 corporations had
participated in the program.” Id. In 1979, no other circuit court had yet to address
the selective waiver issue since Diversified. Id. It is possible that the program’s success
in that year was attributable to the potential for selective waiver to take hold in other
jurisdictions apart from the Eighth Circuit.
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144

litigation.
One by one, however, federal circuits began to address
the issue of selective waiver, and looked upon the doctrine with
145
disfavor.
146
In Permian Corp. v. United States, decided in 1981, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit flatly
rejected selective waiver with respect to the attorney-client privilege,
147
finding the doctrine “wholly unpersuasive.” Permian concerned the
Occidental Petroleum Corporation’s (“Occidental”) hostile takeover
attempt of the Mead Corporation (“Mead”) through an exchange
148
149
offer. Mead resisted the takeover and filed suits in various courts.
During the course of discovery, Occidental turned over millions of
documents to Mead, but added a stipulation that any privileged
materials turned over to Mead would not constitute a waiver of any
150
applicable privilege.
At the same time, Occidental was attempting
to obtain SEC approval of the exchange offer’s registration
statement, and to that end, turned over 1.2 million of its documents
151
to the SEC. In order to expedite the registration process, the SEC
sought access to the documents previously turned over to Mead, as
152
Mead had already organized them in a manageable manner.
Occidental acquiesced to the SEC’s request, and instructed
Mead to furnish the SEC with the relevant documents, pursuant to an
agreement between Occidental and the SEC, whereby the SEC was
153
forbidden from delivering the documents to any third parties.
144

See Teachers, 521 F. Supp. at 644-45 (holding that “disclosure to the SEC should
be deemed to be a complete waiver of the attorney-client privilege unless the right to
assert the privilege in subsequent proceedings is specifically reserved at the time
disclosure is made.”). See also Hornstein, supra note 28, at 476 (noting that “[t]he
Teachers decision essentially adopted the limited waiver rule articulated in Diversified
but added a surmountable hurdle—an intent to retain the attorney-client
privilege.”).
145
See cases cited supra note 18.
146
665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
147
Id. at 1220.
148
Id. at 1215.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 1216.
151
Id.
152
Permian, 665 F.2d at 1216.
153
Id. at 1216-17. In essence, the agreement was designed to enable Occidental to
retain its privileges over the documents in future litigation. Id. While some
controversy existed as to whether the agreement between Occidental and the SEC
amounted to an agreement to keep all of the documents confidential, this matter was
settled by the circuit court as the court found that the agreement did, in effect,
prevent the SEC from delivering the disclosed materials to third parties. Id. at 1219.
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Although Occidental eventually chose to abandon the exchange
offer, Mead supplied the SEC with approximately 1,000 Occidental
documents, of which seven were determined to fall within the ambit
154
of the attorney-client privilege.
Thereafter, the Department of
Energy (“DoE”) launched an investigation of the petroleum pricing
practices of an Occidental subsidiary, and sought the Occidental
155
documents in the SEC’s possession. The SEC informed Occidental
of its intention to comply with the DoE’s request, and Occidental
156
asserted the attorney-client privilege over certain documents.
The D.C. Circuit found that Occidental had wholly waived any
privilege to the documents at issue, and rejected the selective waiver
157
doctrine outright. The court rebuffed Occidental’s assertions that
the attorney-client privilege protects the documents from delivery to
the DoE, noting “the mantle of confidentiality which once protected
the documents [was] so irretrievably breached that an effective waiver
158
of the privilege [was] accomplished.”
The court held that a party
cannot rationally assert the attorney-client privilege while
simultaneously violating the secrecy that the privilege was intended to
advance through purposeful disclosure, noting that “the Eighth
Circuit’s ‘limited waiver’ rule has little to do with this confidential
159
link between the client and his legal advisor.”
Additionally, the
court described selective waiver as unfair to third parties, whereby a
Unfortunately for Occidental, however, the court determined that the existence of
this agreement could not overcome Occidental’s general waiver of privilege through
disclosure to the SEC. Id. at 1220-21. Interestingly, one commentator has noted that
the agreement would have satisfied the “specific preservation” requirement of the
Teachers court, and thus selective waiver would have been permitted under that test as
a manifestation of an intent to preserve applicable privileges as was evident from the
agreement. See Rabbit, supra note 28, at 1214 n.104; Teachers, 521 F. Supp. 638 at
646.
154
Permian, 665 F.2d at 1217. The trial court determined that another twenty-nine
documents were fell within the ambit of the work-product protection, and while the
circuit court observed that “[t]he record [did] not compel such a conclusion,” the
trial court’s finding was not “clearly erroneous,” and hence was affirmed. Id. at 1222.
155
Id. at 1217.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 1222.
158
Permian, 665 F.2d at 1220 (quoting In re Grand Jury of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d
672, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
159
Permian, 665 F.2d at 1220-21. Disagreeing with the holding in Diversified, the
Permian court noted, “[u]nlike the Eighth Circuit, we cannot see how ‘the developing
procedure of corporations to employ independent counsel to investigate and advise
them’ would be thwarted by telling a corporation that it cannot disclose the resulting
reports to the SEC if it wishes to maintain their confidentiality.” Id. at 1221 n.13
(internal citations omitted).
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disclosing party “cannot be permitted to pick and choose among his
opponents, waiving the privilege for some and resurrecting [it] to
obstruct others . . . . The attorney-client privilege is not designed for
160
such tactical employment.”
Finally, by noting that permitting
selective waiver in Permian would prioritize the SEC’s concerns to the
detriment of those of the DoE, the court rejected the policy
161
argument that the benefits of selective waiver outweigh its costs.
Throughout the remainder of the 1980s, the prospect of
selective waiver’s widespread acceptance continued to wane. In In re
162
Subpoena Duces Tecum, the D.C. Circuit reaffirmed its rejection of
the doctrine, noting that the protections afforded by the attorneyclient privilege and the work-product doctrine would be “available
163
only at the traditional price,” such that a party would not be
permitted to “waive that privilege in circumstances where disclosure
might be beneficial while maintaining it in other circumstances
164
where nondisclosure would be beneficial.” Likewise, in In re Martin
165
Marietta Corp., the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit refused to allow a corporation to maintain the attorney-client
privilege and nonopinion work-product protection over materials
166
previously disclosed to the government.
In 1991, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
rejected selective waiver in Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of
167
Philippines.
Westinghouse Electric Corp. (“Westinghouse”) was
under investigation by the Department of Justice (“DoJ”) and the
SEC for allegedly bribing members of the Philippine government in

160

Id. at 1221. Quoting Justice Holmes, the court further noted “the [attorneyclient] privilege does not remain in such circumstances for the mere sake of giving
the client an additional weapon to use or not at his choice.” Id. (quoting Green v.
Crapo, 62 N.E. 956, 959 (Mass. 1902)).
161
Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221.
162
In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Duces Tecum
involved an unsuccessful attempt by the Tesoro Petroleum Corporation to maintain
its privileges over materials previously surrendered to the SEC and a grand jury. Id.
at 1368. The D.C. Circuit permitted a group of class action plaintiffs to access those
materials, holding that Tesoro’s disclosure of the materials to the SEC and the grand
jury operated as a waiver of both the attorney-client privilege and work-product
protection. Id. at 1370-76.
163
Id. at 1370 (quoting Permian, 665 F.2d at 1222).
164
Id.
165
856 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1988).
166
Id. at 620-23.
167
951 F.2d 1414, 1421-28 (1991).
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168

order to secure a lucrative business contract.
In response to the
allegations, the corporation conducted an internal investigation into
the matter, and turned over its results to both agencies, relying on a
specific confidentiality agreement with the DoJ and on SEC
169
regulations indicating that such materials would remain nonpublic.
Nine years later, the Republic of the Philippines brought their own
suit against Westinghouse in a federal district court, alleging inter alia
170
fraud, conspiracy, and RICO violations.
The Philippine
government sought the materials surrendered to the DoJ and the
SEC, arguing that the disclosure by Westinghouse operated as a
waiver of the attorney-client privilege and the work-product
171
protection, otherwise applicable to those materials.
Westinghouse
responded by claiming that it had only selectively waived its privileges
to the materials, and supported its argument by pointing to the
confidentiality arrangement with the DoJ and relevant SEC
172
Unsympathetic to the corporation’s position, the
regulations.
Third Circuit ruled that Westinghouse had fully waived its privileges,
173
and permitted the Philippine government to access the documents.
The Westinghouse court first observed that selective waiver
“extend[s] the [attorney-client] privilege beyond its intended
174
purpose.”
Selective waiver, it said, “does not serve the purpose of
encouraging full disclosure to one’s attorney . . . it merely encourages
175
voluntary disclosure to government agencies.”
Because selective
waiver rests on different policy considerations than those that support
the attorney-client privilege, the Third Circuit held that to recognize
selective waiver would be in effect to recognize a new privilege,
176
something which federal courts had long been cautioned to avoid.
While acknowledging the potential benefits that could be derived
168

Id. at 1418-19. Specifically, Westinghouse sought permission to construct the
Philippines’ first nuclear power plant. Id. at 1418.
169
Id. at 1418-19.
170
Id. at 1420.
171
Id.
172
Id. at 1426.
173
Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1431.
174
Id. at 1425.
175
Id. The court further observed that “[b]ecause the selective waiver rule in
Diversified protects disclosures made for entirely different purposes, it cannot be
reconciled with traditional attorney-client privilege doctrine.” Id.
176
Id. (citing Univ. of Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990)) (noting that
“because privileges obstruct the truth-finding process, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly warned the federal to be cautious in recognizing new privileges.”).
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from permitting selective waiver, the court believed these benefits
were not of sufficient magnitude to allow further hindrance of the
177
truth-finding process. The court also observed that Congress had an
opportunity in 1984 to adopt selective waiver, but elected not to do
178
Because “under traditional waiver doctrine a voluntary
so.
disclosure to a third party waives the attorney-client privilege even if
the third party agrees not to disclose the communications to anyone
else,” the court deemed Westinghouse’s agreement with the DoJ
179
irrelevant.
The Westinghouse court was equally dismissive of the
corporation’s arguments that the work-product protection was
180
Noting that the
applicable to the previously disclosed materials.
work-product doctrine is intended to prevent “an attorney’s work
181
product from falling into the hands of an adversary,” the court
determined that “a party . . . may continue to assert the doctrine’s
protection only when the disclosure furthers the doctrine’s
182
underlying goal.”
The court held that Westinghouse had waived
the work-product protection against all adversaries through its
disclosures to the SEC and DoJ, as disclosures to “forestall
prosecution . . . or to obtain lenient treatment” are not consistent
183
with the traditional objectives of the doctrine.
Unlike the Third Circuit, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit left open the possibility that a party could
184
selectively waive applicable privileges in In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P.
Steinhardt Partners (“Steinhardt”), under investigation for price
185
manipulation of securities, disclosed materials to the SEC without a
186
When civil plaintiffs sought the
confidentiality agreement.
materials to aid in their suit against the firm, Steinhardt claimed that
187
the materials were protected by the work-product doctrine.
177

Id.
Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1427. (citing SEC Statement in Support of Proposed §24(d)
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 16 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 458, 461 (Mar.
2, 1984)).
179
Id. at 1427.
180
Id. at 1429.
181
Id. at 1428.
182
Id. at 1429.
183
Id.
184
9 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1993).
185
Id. at 232.
186
Id.
187
Id.
178
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Although the court ruled that Steinhardt had waived its privilege in
that case, the court declined to adopt “a per se rule that all voluntary
188
disclosures to the government waive work-product protection.”
It
noted that, “[e]stablishing a rigid rule [rejecting selective waiver
outright] would fail to anticipate situations in which the disclosing
party and the government . . . have entered into an explicit
agreement that the [government agency] will maintain the
189
confidentiality of the disclosed materials.” Therefore, the Second
Circuit acknowledged that disclosures made to a government agency,
pursuant to a confidentiality agreement, may permit the corporation
to assert applicable privileges against other parties despite the prior
190
disclosure.
Despite this small victory for supporters of the selective waiver
doctrine, other federal circuits followed the Third Circuit’s lead in
rejecting the selective waiver doctrine outright, regardless of the
191
existence of a confidentiality agreement.
In United States v.
192
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, while the parties did not enter
into a confidentiality agreement, “the [First Circuit] disposed of the
selective waiver doctrine with such a broad stroke [that] it seems that
the existence of a confidentiality agreement would have made little
193
difference.”
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, in Genentech v. United States International Trade
194
195
Commission, refused to apply the doctrine.
Most recently in In re
188

Id. at 236.
Id.
190
Steinhardt, 9 F.3d at 236. In addition, “[s]everal federal district courts,
including those in New York, California, and Colorado, have suggested that selective
waiver is permissible if the disclosing party enters into a confidentiality agreement
and expressly reserves its rights to assert privileges against third parties.” Greenwald
& Thomas, supra note 23, at 12; In re Leslie Fay Co. Sec. Litig., 161 F.R.D. 274, 284
(S.D.N.Y. 1995); In re M & L Bus. Mach. Co., 161 B.R. 689, 696 (D. Colo. 1993);
Kirkland v. Superior Court, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 279, 284 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
191
See Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d 289; Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681; Genentech,
122 F.3d 1409.
192
129 F.3d 681 (1st Cir. 1997).
193
Greenwald & Thomas, supra note 23, at 12 (citing Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d
at 685). In Mass. Inst. of Tech., the Internal Revenue Service sought documents
previously disclosed to the Department of Defense (“DoD”) by the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (“MIT”). Id. at 683. MIT asserted the attorney-client
privilege and work-product protection over the documents; however, the First Circuit
found that those privileges had been waived through MIT’s disclosure of those
documents to the DoD. Id. at 685.
194
122 F.3d 1409 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
195
Id. at 1417. As observed by the Federal Circuit, “[t]his court . . . has never
189
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Columbia/HCA Healthcare Billing Practices Litigation, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected selective waiver “in any
197
of its various forms,”
despite the existence of an applicable
198
confidentiality agreement, and held that adopting selective waiver
199
would transform privilege into “a sword rather than a shield.”
III. SELECTIVE WAIVER DOCTRINE SHOULD BE UNIVERSALLY ADOPTED
Supporters of selective waiver argue that the doctrine
encourages increased cooperation between corporations and the
200
government, “[p]romot[es] [h]eightened [o]bservance of [l]aws
201
and [r]egulations,” and reduces costs for both the investigatory
202
In addition, cooperation may increase
agencies and the judiciary.
the likelihood that the malfeasance at issue will cease, and those
203
perpetrating the crimes will be prosecuted. While the hopeful days
of Diversified have long since passed, perhaps the current climate of
corporate scandal and malfeasance warrants giving selective waiver a
204
second chance. The recent enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
and the Enron and WorldCom collapses have caused directors of
American corporations “to conduct internal investigations at the first
205
sign of trouble.”
The fruits of these investigations would surely
serve a greater societal purpose by being placed in the hands of a
regulatory agency rather than ending up in a paper shredder. While
selective waiver unfortunately does not fall within the ambit of
recognized such a limited waiver.” Also, “[the plaintiff] has presented no compelling
arguments as to why we should apply such a limited waiver theory in this case.” Id.
196
293 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2002). In Columbia/HCA, private litigants sought access
to certain materials previously disclosed to the DoJ by Columbia/HCA Healthcare
Corporation (“Columbia/HCA”), pursuant to a confidentiality agreement, in order
to assist in a Medicare fraud suit against Columbia/HCA. Id. at 291-92. The Sixth
Circuit determined that Columbia/HCA had waived the attorney-client privilege and
work-product protection through its disclosure to the DoJ. Id. at 302.
197
Id. at 302.
198
Id. at 292.
199
Id. at 307.
200
See Hall, supra note 27, at 994.
201
Hall, supra note 27, at 995.
202
See id. at 996-97.
203
See Thomas M. McMahon, Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws, 474 PRAC.
LAW INST./LIT. 319, 452 (1993) (noting that New Jersey’s voluntary disclosure
procedure requires “the nature and extent of the offense and the individuals
responsible for the criminal conduct”).
204
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. (2002)
205
Greenwald & Thomas, supra note 23, at 11.
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“traditional” privilege doctrine, the important societal benefits made
available by selective waiver, with only minimal costs, warrant
recognition of selective waiver in the form of a new privilege. Before
addressing the arguments that support this conclusion, we briefly
review the arguments against selective waiver.
A. Arguments Against Selective Waiver
Critics of selective waiver are initially suspicious that compliance
with applicable laws can actually be achieved through adoption of the
206
doctrine. Pointing to evidence showing voluntary disclosures to the
207
government despite the absence of selective waiver, some have
concluded that the doctrine’s speculative benefits cannot justify a
208
radical departure from traditional waiver concepts.
Critics also charge that the selective waiver doctrine, even if
effective in encouraging disclosure to government agencies, is
209
inherently unfair to private litigants.
Most notably, the Permian
210
court invoked this “fairness doctrine,” and held that permitting a
party to “pick and choose” among those to whom it will disclose
confidential information would be unfair to those third parties to
211
whom disclosures are not made.
One commentator, seizing upon
this reasoning, has argued that “[w]ithin the limits of legislative
authorization, the judicial system should not discriminate between
private parties and government agencies; justice demands that all
212
litigants be treated by the same rules.” In addition, some critics of
selective waiver point out that the public goals promoted by litigation
brought by regulatory agencies are also promoted by litigation

206

See Dorris, supra note 10, at 822-23. Relying on the aforementioned data
concerning corporation participation in the Voluntary Disclosure Program for the
year 1979, Dorris contended that “[t]he SEC-corporation privilege within the limited
waiver rule thus can be abandoned without significantly decreasing voluntary
disclosures to the SEC.” Id.; see infra notes 236-238 and accompanying text.
207
See id.
208
See id.
209
See Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221-22.
210
Id.; Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1426 (describing the D.C. Circuit’s assertion that
the selective waiver doctrine was unfair as an application of the “fairness doctrine”).
211
Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221-22. As noted by the Permian court, “[i]t is apparent
that such a doctrine would enable litigants to pick and choose among regulatory
agencies in disclosing and withholding communications of tarnished confidentiality
for their own purposes. . . . [A] litigant who wishes to assert confidentiality must
maintain genuine confidentiality.” Id.
212
Rabbit, supra note 28, at 1218-19.
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213

brought by public interest groups.
The main criticism of the selective waiver doctrine, however,
focuses upon the inherent difficulty that arises when attempting to
reconcile the doctrine with traditional notions of the attorney-client
214
privilege and the work-product protection.
The underlying
purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to “encourage full and
215
frank communications between attorneys and their clients,”
whereas the work-product protection is intended to ensure the
proper function of the adversarial system by generally preventing
216
adversaries from discovering each other’s trial strategies. Selective
waiver, it is argued, departs from the intended purpose of the
attorney-client privilege, for while the doctrine may encourage
disclosure to the government, it does not serve to promote full
217
disclosure between a client and his attorney. Likewise, the purpose
of the work-product protection is said not to be advanced through
selective waiver, as the promotion of disclosures to the government
are “foreign to the objectives [of preserving the adversarial system]
218
underlying the work-product doctrine.”
Finally, opponents of the
selective waiver theory hold that permitting a party to “selectively
waive” the attorney-client privilege or the work-product protection
conflicts with the general rule that privileges are to be “narrowly
219
construed” and not extended beyond their intended purpose.
B. Justifying Selective Waiver
Selective waiver should be universally adopted because it
encourages cooperation between offending corporations and the
government, thereby reducing costs while simultaneously enhancing
220
law enforcement capabilities.
Selective waiver does not suffer
under a “fairness” analysis, for it does not prevent third parties from

213

Id. at 1219.
See infra notes 260-283 and accompanying text.
215
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
216
See supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text.
217
See supra notes 159-160 and accompanying text.
218
Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1429.
219
See, e.g., Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221 (holding that “[b]ecause the attorney-client
privilege inhibits the truth-finding process, it has been narrowly construed, . . . and
courts have been vigilant to prevent litigants from converting the privilege into a tool
for selective disclosure.” (citations omitted)).
220
See Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 2002 WL 31657622, at *8 (Del. Ch. Nov. 13,
2002); Hall, supra note 27, at 995-96.
214
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bringing their own suit, and moreover, the doctrine would not place
most private litigants in any worse position than they would be
221
without selective waiver. These benefits, and the lack of significant
costs, justify holding the government and private litigants to separate
standards with regard to selective waiver. Selective waiver, however,
undeniably departs from the traditional goals of the attorney-client
privilege and work-product protection. Given that these privileges
are to be narrowly construed, selective waiver can more accurately be
222
described as a new “corporation-government” privilege, rather than
223
mere extensions of the more familiar privileges. The social benefits
of this new privilege far outweigh its drawbacks, and entrenching the
entire realm of privilege within the bounds of traditionalism makes
little sense.
1.

The Benefits of Selective Waiver

The absence of selective waiver deprives government agencies of
potentially valuable information that could otherwise assist them in
224
the enforcement of applicable laws.
Full disclosure of
incriminating materials by corporations to the government increases
the likelihood that the perpetrators of corporate malfeasance will be
225
brought to justice. In effect, individuals apt to commit white-collar
crime will be discouraged from doing so under a regime in which
corporate books revealing such wrongdoing are accessible to law
enforcement. Additionally, a stipulation of the government’s offer of
leniency could reasonably include a demand that the target
corporation increase its internal compliance efforts, to further ensure
that such wrongdoing will be prevented in the future. As a whole,
society benefits from selective waiver because encouraging corporate
disclosure results in greater adherence to applicable laws and
regulations.
Society also benefits from selective waiver in that corporate
221

See Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1426 n.14.
See Dorris, supra note 10, at 801-06. Dorris describes selective waiver as “[a]n
SEC-Corporation [p]rivilege in [d]isguise,” for it encourages a target corporation to
voluntarily disclose incriminating materials to the SEC, in hopes of leniency, as
opposed to furthering the goals of the attorney-client privilege or work-product
protection. Id. Extending this notion beyond merely disclosures to the SEC to
disclosures to any government agency renders the privilege a “corporationgovernment” privilege. Id.
223
Id.
224
See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
225
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
222
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cooperation with government agencies decreases costs related to
226
Apart from increasing the likelihood that
lengthy investigations.
these inquiries will bear fruit, “encouraging corporations to disclose
their internal investigations confidentially allows [a government
227
agency] to resolve its investigation expeditiously and efficiently.” A
recent amicus curiae brief submitted by the SEC revealed that the
agency substantially benefited from voluntary disclosures from
certain targets, from which it was able to avoid incurring costs
228
associated with “approximately 29,000 hours of work.”
Such time
and cost savings permit agencies to resolve “a higher volume of
investigations,” thereby permitting further enforcement of applicable
229
laws and decreasing the potential for corporate criminal activity.
These public policy advantages further strengthen the case that
selective waiver should be universally adopted.
2.

Fairness of Selective Waiver to Third Parties

Selective waiver may appear initially repugnant as seemingly
“unfair to third parties,” for it permits corporations to retain
privileges despite prior disclosures to the government, yet assert those
230
same privileges against subsequent litigants. Selective waiver,
however, imposes only a limited burden upon subsequent litigants,
while simultaneously providing the incentives necessary to encourage
corporations to provide much needed disclosures.
Although
subsequent litigants as a whole are slightly worse off with a selective
waiver rule in place, the benefits of selective waiver far outweigh its
costs.
231
Advocates of selective waiver, including the SEC, contend that
232
the doctrine is Pareto optimal, that is, that it places subsequent
litigants in no worse a position than they would otherwise be in without
226

See Hall, supra note 27, at 995-96; Saito, 2002 WL 31657622, at *8.
Saito, 2002 WL 31657622, at *8.
228
Id. at *8 n.55.
229
Id. at *8.
230
See supra notes 209-213 and accompanying text.
231
Implementation, supra note 8, at 6312 (summarizing the SEC’s position on the
selective waiver issue, as well as noting that the SEC believes that private litigants are
no worse off under a selective waiver rule than otherwise). For over twenty years the
SEC advocated that the selective waiver doctrine should be adopted. See supra note
330 and accompanying text.
232
“Pareto optimality” is defined as “[a]n economic situation in which no person
can be made better off without making someone else worse off.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
227
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233

a selective waiver rule. This assumes that a corporation, without the
benefit of selective waiver, will never elect to disclose materials to a
government agency because of the threat that those materials will
eventually be used against the corporation in a later lawsuit. If this
assumption is accurate, subsequent litigants would be in no worse a
position under selective waiver than under the current regime: if
such materials are not initially disclosed, they are obviously not later
234
obtainable by subsequent litigants.
This argument ignores the fact that corporate disclosures
continue to occur, even though selective waiver is generally not
235
permitted. Imagine that a corporation, in the absence of a selective
waiver rule, weighs its options, discloses otherwise privileged
materials to the government, and concludes that the benefits of
disclosure outweigh its costs. Without selective waiver, a private
litigant who seeks those materials will be able to obtain them despite
a privilege assertion by the corporation. If selective waiver were
implemented, the private litigant would be unable to obtain those
same materials even though the disclosing corporation would have
been willing to make the same disclosure whether selective waiver was
available or not. Hence, the argument that private litigants are
treated equally with or without selective waiver is not entirely true.
This raises the question of when a corporation would willingly
make a disclosure in the absence of selective waiver, knowing that
such materials are susceptible to later discovery. As mentioned,
233

See, e.g., Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1426 n.14. Although ultimately rejecting
selective waiver, the Third Circuit conceded that “when a client discloses privileged
information to a government agency, the private litigant in subsequent proceedings
is no worse off than it would have been had the disclosure to the agency not
occurred.” Id.; Saito, 2002 WL 31657622, at *8 (contending “disclosure to one
adversary does not prejudice a subsequent adversary any more than it would have if
the initial disclosure had never been made.”); Developments in the Law, supra note 10,
at 1645 (observing that “[b]ecause the privilege-holder’s adversary stands in no
better or worse position than if the selective disclosure never occurred, selective
disclosure . . . poses little threat of unfairness.”); Implementation, supra note 8, at
6312 (noting “[a]t worst, private litigants would be in exactly the same position that
they would have been in if the [SEC] had not obtained the privileged or protected
materials.”).
234
See Implementation, supra note 8, at 6312.
235
See, e.g., Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 293. Despite the overwhelming amount of
authority rejecting selective waiver, Columbia/HCA disclosed otherwise privileged
materials to the DoJ. Id. With or without selective waiver, government disclosures
are likely to continue to occur, although they are likely to be fewer in number
without the incentives created by a selective waiver rule. See infra notes 236-242 and
accompanying text.
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supporters of selective waiver have cited the disclosures made
pursuant to the SEC’s short-lived Voluntary Disclosure Program as
evidence that corporations need no additional incentives to
236
cooperate with government investigations. Such data, however, are
misleading. First, although 425 corporations are said to have
237
participated in the Voluntary Disclosure Program in a single year,
the degree of specificity provided within those disclosures is unclear.
It is rational to assume that a rule affording protection to voluntary
disclosures would increase corporations’ willingness to cooperate
more fully, even though some level of cooperation can be achieved
without such a rule. Second, the disclosures made pursuant to the
Voluntary Disclosure Program occurred shortly after the Eighth
Circuit’s decision in Diversified, at a time when corporations may have
been confident that courts would generally recognize a selective
238
waiver rule.
Third, the fact that some corporations have
participated in the Voluntary Disclosure Program without selective
waiver does not reflect the amount of cooperation that could be
achieved if a rule protecting voluntary disclosures were to exist.
Since the essence of privilege is confidentiality, statistical
information concerning the reasons for nondisclosure is difficult to
obtain. As is the case with respect to the attorney-client privilege and
the work-product protection, policy choices concerning whether to
adopt or expand a particular privilege are rarely supported by hard
239
data.
Nevertheless, despite this lack of data, it appears that many
valuable disclosures are not made because no general rule exists to
maintain privileged status over otherwise privileged materials
voluntarily turned over to the government. Parties typically defend
their privileges unless dire circumstances or foolishness effectuate
240
their voluntary surrender.
Practitioners generally advise that
disclosures to the government should be avoided whenever possible,
236

See Dorris, supra note 10, at 822 (observing that in 1979, over 425 corporations
participated in the SEC’s Voluntary Disclosure Program); Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at
1426 (citing Dorris, supra note 10, at 822).
237
Dorris, supra note 10, at 822.
238
Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977).
239
See, e.g., Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511 (citing no data, but in support of adopting
the work-product doctrine, noting that without such protection, “[t]he effect on the
legal community would be demoralizing. And the interests of clients and the cause
of justice would be poorly served.”).
240
See Cynthia B. Feegan, Comment, Issues of Waiver in Multi-Party Litigation: The
Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work-Product Doctrine, 61 UMKC L. REV. 757, 760 (1993)
(noting that “[i]nstances of express waiver are rare . . . .”).
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as the fallout from losing privileged status over sensitive materials can
241
Furthermore, the fact that the SEC continues to
be catastrophic.
support selective waiver suggests that it believes a vast amount of
information is lost due to fears, founded or unfounded, that
242
disclosed materials could be made public.
Given increased availability of potentially valuable disclosures
which could be realized through selective waiver, and the relatively
few disclosures presently made in its absence, selective waiver
approaches Pareto optimality even if it does not achieve it absolutely.
The prospective costs associated with a poorly chosen disclosure
cause corporations to resist cooperation, therefore placing most
private litigants in no worse a position than they would be under a
selective waiver regime.
The aforementioned social benefits
associated with the doctrine more than offset the advantages gained
by the small number of litigants who benefit from the current
absence of selective waiver.
243
Far from constituting an offensive or unfair use of privilege,
selective waiver permits the aforementioned public policy concerns to
244
be advanced, but at little cost to third parties.
The presence or
absence of selective waiver likely weighs heavily in a corporation’s
decision to disclose or not to disclose sensitive materials to the
245
government. Without the ability to retain privileges after the initial
disclosure, a corporation is similarly likely to refuse to make such
246
Thus, government agencies are deprived access to
disclosures.
many useful materials, as are subsequent litigants. If selective waiver
were adopted, the corporation would be more likely to cooperate
with the government and make full disclosure of privileged
documents. Rather than being unfair to private litigants, who may
241

See Strassberg & Walters, supra note 12.
Implementation, supra note 8, at 6312 (“[T]he [SEC] finds that allowing
issuers to produce internal reports to the [SEC] . . . without waiving otherwise
applicable privileges serves the public interest because it significantly enhances
[SEC’s] ability to conduct expeditious investigations . . . .”).
243
See supra notes 54, 160 and accompanying text.
244
Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1426 n.14.
245
See Greenwald & Thomas, supra note 23, at 50.
246
Saito, 2002 WL 31657622, at *9. As noted by the Saito court:
Imposing the harsh consequence of a waiver upon disclosing parties
will discourage confidential disclosures.
When the benefits of
leniency . . . are uncertain, yet the burden of exposing a company’s
Achilles’ heel to a flood of adversaries is certain, corporations will be
less likely to choose to disclose work product to the SEC.
Id.
242
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still bring suit, “litigating [third parties] want to have their cake and
eat it too: they want disclosing parties to continue disclosing to
[government agencies] so they are better protected, while at the
same time they want access to these disclosures for their own tactical
247
advantage.”
3.

The Unique Role of the Government Litigant

A selective waiver rule which permits privileges to be asserted
against private litigants despite prior government disclosures disrupts
248
the equal treatment all litigants are currently provided.
Selective
waiver necessarily requires that the government be “given special
favor when it comes to benefiting from selective waiver of
249
privilege.”
It is true that to some degree that private suits also
250
vindicate the public interest by punishing corporate malfeasance.
Nonetheless, there are good reasons for believing that government
suits are generally better suited to serving public interests. Private
251
litigants are often sidetracked in their effort to be made whole.
Since the primary motivation in private suits is damages, rather than
remedying future harms, private litigants most often lack the
252
necessary focus upon curative measures.
By contrast, government
253
suits are focused on remedying and preventing illegal behavior.
247

Id.
See Jody Okrzesik, Note, Selective Waiver: Should the Government Be Privy to
Privileged Information Without Waiving the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product
Doctrine?, 34 U. MEM. L. REV. 115, 167-68 (2003).
249
Id.
250
Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 303 (contending that “[a] plaintiff in a shareholder
derivative action or a qui tam action who exposes accounting and tax fraud provides
as much service to the ‘truth finding process’ as an SEC investigator”).
251
Id. at 312 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (observing that “[p]rivate litigants, often
encouraged by large potential liability, on balance will have a greater incentive to
press the legal envelope and to pursue legal actions less certainly within the public
interest.”).
252
See id.
253
See EEOC v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 383 F.3d 1280, 1291 (11th Cir. 2004). The
Pemco court observed:
This principle is based primarily upon the recognition that the United
States has an interest in enforcing federal law that is independent of
any claims of private citizens. . . . It is precisely this public interest
function that distinguishes governmental agencies from private
litigants, . . . these agencies have responsibilities with a scope far
beyond the legal interests of individual plaintiffs.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Martin H. Redish & Andrew L. Matthews, Why
Punitive Damages are Unconstitutional, 53 EMORY L.J. 1, 31 (2004) (observing that when
248
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This, coupled with the government’s ability to levy criminal penalties,
warrants different treatment of these two classes of litigants.
In his dissenting opinion in Columbia/HCA, Judge Boggs
outlined four reasons why treating the government differently from
254
private litigants in the context of selective waiver is justifiable. First,
Judge Boggs posited that, due to the limited resources and financial
impartiality of a government investigation, the “government
255
investigations are more likely to be in the public interest.” Second,
he observed that the government’s authority to fine or imprison
256
offenders gives government investigations a unique character.
Third, “[t]he costs and benefits of government investigations are
diffuse, and therefore managing those costs and benefits most
257
efficiently is definitionally in the public interest.”
Lastly, Judge
Boggs noted that the more stringent procedural requirements of a
criminal matter, as opposed to a civil one, should permit disclosures
to a government entity, while shielding those disclosures from private
258
litigants.
“Unlike private litigants, government litigants ‘represent and
259
serve a public constituency, even in litigation.’” Although at risk of
being labeled paternalistic, selective waiver better equips the
government to pursue the public interest while having little or no
effect upon private suits. Recognizing the fundamental differences
between the goals and limitations of the private and government
litigant makes clear that distinguishing the two in the manner that
selective waiver demands is justified.

private litigants are induced to further the public interest through enforcement of
their individual private rights, those litigants are often referred to as “private
attorneys general.”).
254
Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 312 (Boggs, J., dissenting). For a complete
discussion of Justice Boggs’ dissent, see Okrzesik, supra note 248, at 164-70.
255
Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 312 (Boggs, J., dissenting).While private suits may
not vindicate public interests effectively due to personal matters at stake, it has been
argued that unlike private litigants, public interest groups who initiate suit do so free
from personal interests. See id.; Rabbit, supra note 28, at 1219. Public interest
groups, however, are not investigatory arms of a democratically elected government,
and therefore should not be entitled to benefit from selective disclosure. See infra
note 257 and accompanying text.
256
Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 312 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
257
Id. (Boggs, J., dissenting).
258
Id. (Boggs, J., dissenting).
259
Laurie Kratky Doré, Settlement, Secrecy, and Judicial Discretion: South Carolina’s
New Rules Governing the Sealing of Settlements, 55 S.C. L. REV. 791, 810 (2004).
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Reconciling Selective Waiver with Traditional Privilege
Concepts

The most frequent source of criticism of selective waiver arises
from the apparent inconsistencies between the underlying purposes
of the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine, and the
260
underlying function of selective waiver. Selective waiver encourages
disclosure to the government, which although laudable, is an end
261
different in kind from encouraging disclosure to one’s attorney or
262
maintaining the integrity of the adversarial system.
The correct
response to this fact, however, is not to reject selective waiver but
263
rather to recognize it as a new “corporation-government” privilege.
a.

Selective Waiver and The Attorney-Client Privilege

Proponents of selective waiver, however, have often sought to fit
the square peg of selective waiver into the round hole of traditional
264
privilege constructions. The Diversified court attempted to reconcile
the objectives of the attorney-client privilege with those of selective
waiver by observing that corporations may elect not to hire counsel to
conduct internal investigations in response to allegations of
265
wrongdoing without the doctrine.
It has also been argued that a
corporation “who cooperates with a government investigation is
seeking ‘informed legal advice’ with the objective of fully complying
266
with the applicable laws and regulations.” A corporation, however,
may acquire legal advice from an attorney without disclosing those
267
communications to a government agency. While the attorney-client
privilege is said to “promote broader public interests in the
268
observance of law and administration of justice,” this goal is merely
the desired by-product of fostering “full and frank communication
269
between attorneys and their clients.”
260

See, e.g., Permian, 665 F.2d at 1219; Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1429; Steinhardt, 9
F.3d at 235; Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 684; Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 306. See
also, Hall, supra note 27, at 1000.
261
See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
262
Id.
263
See infra notes 293-300 and accompanying text.
264
See, e.g., Hall, supra note 27, at 1000-01.
265
See Diversified, 572 F.2d at 611.
266
Hall, supra note 27, at 1000.
267
Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221.
268
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
269
Id.
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Expanding the privilege to include communications between
corporations and non-attorney third parties vitiates the general
principle that existing evidentiary privileges are to be narrowly
270
construed. Often, these communications could be said to only bear
271
an attenuated relation with promoting “observance of the law.”
Such a rule could enable virtually any communication between two
parties to be privileged provided that it is intended to bring the
disclosing party within compliance with applicable laws. Construing
the attorney-client privilege in this manner reduces the attorney to
the status of a middleman, bridging the gap between the traditional
attorney-client privilege and a new privilege protecting disclosures by
272
a corporation to the government.
As such, selective waiver can
more accurately be described as creating a new realm of protected
273
communications.
b.

Selective Waiver and the Work-Product Protection

Attempts to harmonize selective waiver with the underlying goals
of the work-product protection likewise suffer from a similar
disconnect. As mentioned, the work-product doctrine is intended to
preserve the nature of the adversary system by protecting documents
and tangible things prepared by or on behalf of an attorney in
274
anticipation of litigation from discovery.
A disclosure of such
would-be protected materials to an adversary results in a waiver of the
275
privilege vis-à-vis all parties. Typically, when a corporation discloses
materials otherwise protected by the work-product doctrine to the
government, this act is considered an implied waiver of the privilege,
276
as the government is most often considered an adversary. Even the
Eighth Circuit, despite the Diversified holding, rejects the application
277
of selective waiver to the work-product doctrine.
270

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-10 (1974).
Id. While corporations may seek full future compliance with applicable laws
and regulations, it is naïve to assume that a corporation’s decision to disclose
materials is motivated by the desire to achieve compliance with applicable laws rather
than desire to avoid harsh punishment.
272
See Dorris, supra note 10, at 805-06.
273
See id. at 806.
274
See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-11.
275
See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
276
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
277
See In re Chrysler Motors Corp. Overnight Evaluation Program, 860 F.2d 844,
846 (8th Cir. 1988). In Chrysler, the Eighth Circuit held that a corporation’s
disclosure of materials otherwise covered by the work-product protection, were
271
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Corporations have often sought to claim that work product
disclosures to government agencies fall within the ambit of the
278
common interest exception,
which permits non-adversarial
279
disclosures without waiver of the work-product protection.
Proponents of selective waiver argue that “because both the
government and the cooperating [corporation] are likely to be
working toward a similar goal (the disclosing party’s compliance with
laws and regulations) the parties can be said to share common
280
interests in the matter.” Such arguments always fail to sway courts,
281
as even those few courts that embrace selective waiver reject them.
It is difficult to view the relationship between the investigating
government agency and the target corporation as anything other
than adversarial, given that the government seeks to criminally
discoverable by the government by virtue of their prior disclosure to certain class
action plaintiffs. Id. While Chrysler did not make mention of Diversified with respect
to selective waiver, the issue of whether Diversified continued to remain good law in
light of Chrysler came before a district court within the Eighth Circuit in McDonnell
Douglas, 922 F. Supp. at 243. Reconciling Chrysler and Diversified, the district court
distinguished Chrysler on the grounds that it involved the work-product protection,
unlike Diversified, which exclusively addressed the selective waiver issue within the
context of the attorney-client privilege. Id. Thus, selective waiver does not apply to
the work-product protection in the Eighth Circuit. Id. Interestingly, however, “[w]hy
waiver doctrine should require different resolutions for voluntary disclosures of
attorney-client work product rather than attorney-client privileged communications
was not examined [by the McDonnell Douglas court] in terms of any policy
justifications associated with either doctrine.” James M. Fischer, The Attorney-Client
Privilege Meets the Common Interest Arrangement: Protecting Confidences While Exchanging
Information for Mutual Gain, 16 REV. LITIG. 631, 658 n.81 (1997). Of course, Chrysler is
also distinguishable from Diversified on the grounds that the initial disclosure made
in Chrysler was made to a private party, and a privilege was asserted against the
government, whereas in Diversified, the initial disclosure was made to the
government, and a privilege was asserted against a private party. See Chrysler, 860 F.2d
at 845-46; Diversified, 572 F.2d at 600.
278
See, e.g., Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 314 (Boggs, J., dissenting); Westinghouse,
951 F.2d at 1431; Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 686 (holding the common interest
exception inapplicable as the corporation was considered an adversary of the
government, not a party sharing a common interest with the government).
279
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
280
Hall, supra note 27, at 998.
281
See Saito, 2002 WL 31657622, at *5. As observed by the chancery court:
The common interest question here boils down to whether the
[investigating agency] acts as a friend or foe. . . . [The disclosing
corporation] knew it was a target [and] knew the disclosure was being
sought as part of this investigation. . . . The fact that [the disclosing
corporation] ‘cooperated voluntarily does not transform the
relationship from adversarial to friendly.
Id. at *4-*5. (internal citations omitted).
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282

punish the corporation.
While the nature of the adversarial
relationship is unique in that the parties include law enforcement
and a suspected offender, in contrast with opposing civil litigants, the
283
parties are adversaries nonetheless.
As the work-product doctrine
does not distinguish between criminal and civil adversaries, selective
waiver does not fit neatly within the parameters of the work-product
protection.
c.

Selective Waiver and the Self-Evaluative Privilege

The self-evaluative privilege limits the discoverability of certain
self-critical analyses, the accuracy of which are of great public import,
and the accuracy of which could potentially be compromised if
284
discovery were to be permitted.
Although first recognized in
285
1970, the self-evaluative privilege has been met with significant
skepticism, with some courts suggesting that the Supreme Court has
286
implicitly rejected the new privilege entirely.
Apart from the
287
privilege’s uncertain validity, finer points of the self-evaluative
privilege reveal that even if the privilege is judicially accepted, it does
288
not embrace selective waiver.
Although materials disclosed pursuant to a government
investigation may be of significant public importance, the accuracy,
creation, or disclosure of which could be chilled if no privilege were
applicable to them, “courts may be inclined to allow a waiver of the
self-evaluative privilege through voluntary disclosures to a
289
government agency.”
First, while “a self-evaluative review may be
282

See Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1428 (“Unlike a party who assists the government
in investigating or prosecuting another, . . . Westinghouse was the target of
investigations conducted by the agencies. Under these circumstances, we have no
difficulty concluding that the SEC and the DOJ were Westinghouse’s adversaries.”)
(internal citation omitted).
283
See id.
284
See Conway, supra note 84, at 634; Ronald G. Blum & Andrew J. Turro, The SelfEvaluative Privilege in the Second Circuit: Dead or Alive?, 75 N.Y. ST. B.J. 44, 44 (June
2003). The self-evaluative privilege is also known as the self-critical analysis privilege.
Id.
285
See Bredice v. Doctors Hosp. Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249, 250 (D.D.C. 1970).
286
See Blum & Turro, supra note 284, at 45 (observing that “[s]everal local federal
district courts suggest that the 1990 U.S. Supreme Court decision in University of
Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 492 U.S. 182 (1990)
conclusively rejects the very basis of the privilege.”).
287
Id.
288
See Conway, supra note 84, at 656-57.
289
Id. at 657.
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worthless if the results are not shared with certain federal agencies,”
290
the privilege does not specifically contemplate the issue of waiver.
Second, by law many courts require corporations to conduct the self291
critical analysis.
As a voluntary disclosure of sensitive materials to
the government does not appear to fall within the grasp of the
292
sporadically accepted self-evaluative privilege, selective waivers are
not readily permissible within the protections afforded by the selfevaluative privilege.
d. Selective Waiver as a New Corporation-Government
Privilege
The previous discussion demonstrates that existing evidentiary
privileges rest on policy considerations different from those that
support selective waiver. Selective waiver should, therefore, be
recognized as a new evidentiary privilege, a corporation-government
privilege, rather than a mere extension of existing privileges. In this
way, the integrity of our existing privileges remains because they do
not become riddled with exceptions. Just as an attenuated argument
can be made to fit the attorney work-product protection within the
parameters of the attorney-client privilege, the two privileges indeed
are unique and apply in different circumstances. Similarly, the
selective waiver doctrine is a creature distinct from any of our existing
privileges.
Evidentiary privileges are a cause for concern “because they
293
impede the search for truth.” Consequently, a new privilege should
not be created “unless it ‘promotes sufficiently important interests to
294
outweigh the need for probative evidence.’”
As the previous
discussion demonstrates, selective waiver encourages a corporation
under criminal investigation to disclose otherwise privileged material,
295
thereby allowing for the expeditious resolution of such inquiries.
The increased likelihood of bringing the perpetrators to justice, and
the increased potential that similar corporate malfeasance will not
occur again, however, come at the cost of certain evidence being

290

Id.
Id. at 637.
292
Id. at 641.
293
Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 130 (2003).
294
Univ. of Pa., 493 U.S. at 189 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51
(1980)).
295
See Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1425-29.
291
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296

unavailable at subsequent civil trials. While perhaps the absence of
297
such evidence may “impede the search for truth” in civil trials, the
corporation, “by waiving the privilege as to the [g]overnment[,] . . .
furthers the truth-finding process” with respect to the criminal
298
investigation. As mentioned, this evidence may come to neither the
299
government nor the civil litigant if selective waiver is not permitted.
The government’s unique role as protector of the public interest at
300
In sum, a new
large warrants this type of specialized treatment.
corporation-government privilege would enhance the overall truthfinding process.
IV. IMPLEMENTING SELECTIVE WAIVER
The inquiry into whether selective waiver should be adopted
does not end by merely concluding that a new privilege embodying
selective waiver concepts should be received. Multiple forms of the
doctrine exist, requiring a weighing of the interests at stake
associated with each form. Determining the appropriate branch of
government to adopt selective waiver is also of particular concern.
Furthermore, the scope of the new privilege must be determined.
This Comment concludes that selective waiver should be adopted by
Congress in the form of a new privilege, shielding from discovery by
private litigants only those materials which would otherwise be
protected by traditional privileges, provided a confidentiality
agreement is secured at the time of the initial disclosure.
A. Selective Waiver Forms
Selective waiver can take a variety of forms, each having its own
unique advantages and drawbacks. For any type of selective waiver,
especially one construed as an entirely new privilege, an initial
301
disclosure must be made to a government agency.
One form of
296

See Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 303.
Guillen, 537 U.S. at 130.
298
Id. (quoting Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221).
299
See supra notes 230-247 and accompanying text.
300
See supra notes 254-259 and accompanying text.
301
An additional form of selective waiver exists, known as “general selective
waiver.” Rabbit, supra note 28, at 1217. General selective waiver entirely abandons
the very notion of implied waiver, such that “a breach of confidentiality . . . in one
setting or to one party would never effect a waiver of the privilege as to any other
party or in any other proceeding.” Id. at 1218. Pursuant to a general selective
waiver, a party could disclose privileged materials to a private litigant, yet maintain
privileged status over those materials in subsequent litigation against the
297
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selective waiver, known as “selective administrative selective waiver,”
permits a party to maintain its privileges over materials after an initial
disclosure to a government agency even vis-à-vis another government
302
agency. On the other hand, the selective waiver doctrine could also
303
take the form of an “overall administrative selective waiver,”
whereby a disclosing party would be permitted to maintain its
applicable privileges over materials previously disclosed to a
government agency, but only vis-à-vis private parties, such that other
government agencies would not be thwarted in their efforts to
304
subpoena the previously disclosed materials. This latter form of the
doctrine appropriately balances the competing interests at stake, and
comes closest to achieving the goals of the selective waiver doctrine.
1.

Selective Administrative Selective Waiver

The form of the selective waiver doctrine known as selective
administrative selective waiver may in many cases prevent one
government agency’s access to materials previously disclosed to
305
another government agency. In short, when a corporation makes a
disclosure, the otherwise applicable privileges are waived only to that
agency—the privileges would remain as to all other parties, including
both private litigants and other government agencies. Permian is
illustrative of the problem a selective administrative selective waiver
306
would create. In Permian, a corporation asserted its otherwise
applicable privileges over materials previously disclosed to the SEC
307
when the DoE sought discovery of those materials.
Rejecting
selective waiver, the Permian court warned that permitting selective
waiver in such a case would allow the corporation to prioritize the
308
SEC’s concerns over those of the DoE.

government. Id. A general selective waiver does not advance the public policy goals
underlying the doctrine. Id.
302
Rabbit, supra note 28, at 1217. The author of the aforementioned note refers
to this form of the doctrine as “selective administrative limited waiver.” The term
“selective waiver,” however, is preferred over the term “limited waiver.” See supra note
10.
303
Rabbit, supra note 28, at 1217 (referring to this form of the doctrine as “overall
administrative limited waiver”).
304
See id.
305
See id.
306
Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221.
307
See supra notes 147-156 and accompanying text.
308
Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221.
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Overall Administrative Selective Waiver

Overall administrative selective waiver permits a disclosing
corporation to maintain its privileges in subsequent litigation against
309
private parties, but not against other federal agencies.
Thus,
corporations’ disclosures will not be subject to the prying eyes of
private litigants seeking access to the disclosed materials, but
nevertheless are at risk of being subpoenaed by other government
310
agencies. Rejecting selective administrative selective waiver in favor
of the “overall administrative” form of the doctrine is advantageous
for a variety of reasons. This construction of selective waiver removes
impediments to government investigations, as it allows a free flow of
information between individual government agencies. In this way, a
corporation is not permitted to “pick and choose among regulatory
311
agencies.” A disclosure to one agency operates as a waiver to all
312
agencies, but not to private litigants.
Given the special role and
powers of the government related to pursuing the public interest, it is
proper to afford the federal government as a whole the use of the
disclosed materials in any manner which best serves the public
313
interest.
Yet, even if one assumes the benefits potentially achievable
through the doctrine in the abstract, this form of the selective waiver
314
is not without criticism.
First, like other forms of selective waiver,
overall administrative selective waiver “would give governmental
agencies a decided advantage over private parties in the evidentiary
315
process,” as even non-governmental public interest groups would
not be permitted to benefit from corporate disclosures to the
316
government.
Second, since a disclosure made pursuant to an
overall administrative waiver may be made available to other federal
agencies, disclosing corporations must be mindful that their waiver is
quite broad. Permian is merely one example where one federal
317
agency seeks access to materials previously disclosed to another.
Under this form of selective waiver, therefore, corporations may still
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317

See Rabbit, supra note 28, at 1217.
See id.
Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221-22.
See supra notes 309-311.
See Rabbit, supra note 28, at 1218-19.
See id.
Id. at 1218.
Id. at 1219.
See generally Permian, 665 F.2d at 1217.
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resist an initial waiver, as expanding the scope of waiver undermines
corporate willingness to cooperate with government investigations.
3.

Suggested Form

Although overall selective waiver may inhibit certain disclosures
that would occur if the information would be available to only one
agency, implementing an overall administrative selective waiver best
advances the public policy goals achievable through selective waiver.
An expansive waiver policy, i.e., one which allows federal agencies to
share disclosed materials, is more likely to be eventually implemented
as it constitutes a less radical shift from the current rule, which
generally rejects selective waiver. Although a disclosing corporation
must be mindful that under such a rule its waiver of privilege
operates as a waiver with regard to all federal agencies, this fact alone
is unlikely to prevent increased cooperation with government
investigations. Much of the legal scholarship addressing selective
318
waiver, including commentary by corporate practitioners, concerns
the consequences of an initial disclosure as operating as a waiver as to
private litigants, giving rise to the presumption that corporations are
319
particularly wary of the threat of the private litigant. Additionally,
the government’s position as a representative of the public in

318

See, e.g., Greenwald & Thomas, supra note 23, at 11; Strassberg & Walters, supra
note 12, at 7. David M. Greenwald is a partner at Jenner & Block, LLC. Greenwald
& Thomas, supra note 23, at 11; Jenner & Block Attorney Directory, at
http://www.jenner.com/people/bio.asp?id=46 (last visited Feb. 7, 2005); Matthew J.
Thomas is also a partner at Jenner & Block, LLC. Greenwald & Thomas, supra note
23, at 11; Jenner & Block Attorney Directory, at http://www.jenner.com/
people/bio.asp?id=28 (last visited Feb. 7, 2005). Richard M. Strassberg is a partner
at Goodwin Procter, LLP and served as chief of the Major Crimes Unit in the United
States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York. Id. Sarah E. Walters
is a former associate at Goodwin Procter, LLP. Press Release, Goodwin Procter, LLP,
Goodwin Procter Attorneys Win 2004 Burton Award for Legal Achievement (June 14,
2004) at http://www.goodwinprocter.com/press-release.asp?ID=54. Mr. Strassberg
and Ms. Walters were selected to receive the Burton Award for Legal Achievement,
“which honors excellence in legal writing” for the cited article Is Selective Waiver of
Privilege Viable? Id.; Strassberg & Walters, supra note 12, at 7.
319
See, e.g., Strassberg & Walters, supra note 12, at 7. Strassberg & Walters
observed:
It is a fair bet that any civil lawsuits that follow a government
investigation are sure to request the disclosure of any internal
investigation, and if the privilege no longer applies, the company may
find itself handing over to civil plaintiffs a virtual road map to assist
them in their lawsuit.
Id. (emphasis added).
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general, and not merely certain private interests,
warrants
321
While
particularized treatment of the government litigant.
disclosures to one federal agency operate as a waiver to all federal
agencies under the preferred form of selective waiver, this fact alone
is unlikely to eviscerate the public policy benefits behind the
doctrine.
Allowing federal agencies as a whole to share disclosures among
themselves allows for the most effective and appropriate enforcement
of law. Unlike private litigants, who are primarily concerned with
322
their own aims, federal agencies, operating under the auspices of
serving the public interest, must be permitted to make full use of
disclosed materials so that the public is adequately protected from all
corporate misconduct, not merely misconduct that relates to the
duties of the agency to whom the first disclosure is made. Although a
broader selective waiver rule will inevitably cause certain corporations
to refrain from cooperating with certain government investigations,
an overall federal selective waiver is nevertheless likely to increase the
number of disclosures that are currently made, for it effectively
removes the threat of private litigants making use of said disclosures.
B. Congressional Action Is Required
Selective waiver occupies an area of legal limbo. Neither
legislatures nor courts have indicated that they are the appropriate
body to embrace the doctrine. Whereas courts claim that Congress
323
may act to permit selective waiver, Congress has been especially
324
reluctant to tinker with privilege law.
The difficult policy
considerations related to choosing the appropriate form of selective
waiver, weigh heavily in favor of this matter being addressed
325
legislatively.
Conversely, courts traditionally have monopolized
320

See supra notes 254-259 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 248-259 and accompanying text.
322
See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
323
See Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 685.
324
See Timothy P. Glynn, Federalizing Privilege, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 87-88 (2002)
(observing that when the Federal Rules of Evidence were initially adopted, Congress,
“displaying rare interest in the proposed rules and the rule-making process,”
specifically rejected a section of the proposed rules codifying privilege law.).
325
See Karla H. Alderman, Comment, Making Sense of Oregon’s Equitable Exception to
the American Rule of Attorney Fees after Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 407,
413 (1999) (observing that the United States Supreme Court has declined to rule in
a manner which would necessarily hold certain public interests in higher esteem
than others); see also Aaron v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 446 U.S. 680, 702-03 (1980)
321
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326

privilege law,
primarily because of their experience and
327
Because courts generally reject
understanding of such doctrines.
328
selective waiver and Congress is hesitant to enter the privilege
329
fray, the net result is the maintenance of the status quo. Although
judicial efforts to adopt selective waiver should be welcomed, the
promise of the doctrine can likely only be realized through legislative
action.
In 1984, the SEC, recognizing the benefits of selective waiver,
asked Congress to amend section 24(d) of the Securities and
330
Exchange Act of 1934 (“the Exchange Act”). Specifically, the SEC
proposed that “the disclosure of any information by any person to the
[SEC] . . . shall not constitute a waiver of any legally cognizable
privilege,” if the disclosing party asserts the privilege and its basis

(Burger, C.J., concurring) (noting that a proper interpretation of statutory text that
results in “‘bad’ public policy” is “the concern of Congress where changes can be
made.”); see also In re Terry W., 130 Cal. Rptr. 913, 914-15 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). The
Terry court observed that a parent’s disclosure of incriminating statements made by
her child to law enforcement was not protected by either the privilege against selfincrimination nor a “penumbral” right to privacy. Id. at 914. The court went on to
note that “the penumbra is limited to the relationship of husband and wife . . . [and]
[a]ttempts to expand its dimensions to [other areas] have proved unsuccessful.” Id.
at 914-15 (citations omitted). The Terry court concluded “[the fact] [t]hat the
problem is one which should be addressed legislatively rather than judicially is
emphasized by unanswerable questions whether the ‘privilege’ should be that of
parent, child, or both, how the ‘privilege’ may be waived, and what exceptions, if any,
to the ‘privilege’ should exist.” Id. at 915 (emphasis added). Similarly, the policy
concerns related to the scope and form of a selective waiver rule suggest that the
matter is better addressed through legislative action.
326
See Glynn, supra note 324, at 87-88.
327
See FED. R. EVID. 501. Rule 501 provides:

Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United
States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a
witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof
shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may
be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings,
with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State
law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be
determined in accordance with State law.
Id.
328

See supra notes 142-199 and accompanying text.
See supra note 327.
330
SEC Review of Enforcement Remedies, Proposed Legislation on Administrative
Proceedings, FOIA Privilege, 16 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 456, 461 (Mar. 2, 1984).
329
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331

therefor.
Although the acceptance of selective waiver by the SEC
would appear to lend credence to the doctrine’s value, the doctrine’s
detractors have seized upon Congress’ failure to adopt the SEC
proposal in an effort to support the argument against selective waiver.
The Westinghouse court, in justifying its rejection of selective
waiver, incorrectly noted that “Congress rejected an amendment to
the [Exchange Act] . . . that would have established a selective waiver
332
rule.” Congress, in fact, “did not reject the [SEC’s 1984] proposal;
rather, the House Committee to which the proposal was submitted
333
Not only did the Third Circuit
[merely] took no action.”
mischaracterize the nature of the alleged congressional “rejection” of
selective waiver, but the court also erroneously afforded this
334
circumstance meaning.
Rather than constituting any form of
persuasive authority, such “unsuccessful proposals to amend a law, in
335
the years following its passage, carry no significance.” Although the
Westinghouse court, as well as numerous commentators, have relied
upon House Committee’s failure to act on the SEC proposal as
336
constituting a reason to reject selective waiver, the fact “that the
proposal before that House Committee in 1984 was not ultimately
337
enacted carries no significance.”
Most recently, the SEC proposed a rule permitting selective
338
waiver as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Subsection 205.3(e)(3)
read: “[w]here an issuer, through its attorney, shares with the [SEC]
information related to a material violation, pursuant to a
confidentiality agreement, such sharing of information shall not
constitute a waiver of any otherwise applicable privilege or protection
339
as to other persons.”
The SEC, however, ultimately withdrew its
proposal citing “the concern that some courts might not adopt the
[SEC’s] analysis of [selective waiver], and that this could lead to
adverse consequences for the attorneys and issuers who disclose
information to the [SEC] pursuant to a confidentiality agreement,
331
332
333
334
335
336
337

Id.
Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1425.
Implementation, supra note 8, at 6312 n.116.
See Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1425.
NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 299 (7th Cir. 1992).
See, e.g., Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1425.
Implementation, supra note 8, at 6312 n.116 (citing Am. Family, 978 F.2d at

299).
338
339

See id.
Id.
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believing that the evidentiary protections accorded that information
340
In essence, the SEC feared that “attorneys
remain preserved.”
might disclose information to the [SEC] in the belief that the
evidentiary privileges for that information were preserved, only to
341
have a court subsequently rule that the privilege was waived.”
The parameters of a rule embracing selective waiver require a
legislative solution, as courts’ cool reception of the doctrine has
342
prevented its widespread judicial adoption. General proscriptions
against expanding our existing privileges have effectively caused
courts to turn a blind eye to the public benefits afforded by a selective
343
waiver rule.
Courts, however, cannot be expected to weigh the
large-scale competing interests at stake surrounding the decision to
adopt a selective waiver rule. The current political climate, only
344
recently rocked by a swath of corporate scandals, renders the
selective waiver issue sufficiently ripe for legislative action.
C. Scope of the New Privilege
An overall corporation-government privilege requires two
345
important limitations. First, the “privilege” should be qualified ,
much like the work-product protection, such that a showing of
substantial need or undue hardship would be sufficient to vitiate the
346
protections of the privilege.
While qualifying the privilege may
serve to chill a corporation’s willingness to make disclosures to the
government, the new privilege nevertheless renders cooperation with
a government investigation more attractive than without the
privilege. Accounting for the potential that certain circumstances
may require the privilege to yield to greater concerns renders the
347
privilege flexible in situations where such flexibility is warranted.
Although the work-product protection may also be overcome in

340

Id. at 6312 n.117
Id. at 6312. In support of its decision to withdraw its proposed selective waiver
rule, the SEC cited a potential conflict with FED. R. EVID. 501. Id.; see supra note 327
and accompanying text. Additionally, the SEC noted concern that “it was uncertain
if the Sarbanes-Oxley Act granted the [SEC] the authority to promulgate a [selective
waiver] rule.” Implementation, supra note 8, at 6312.
342
See supra notes 142-199 and accompanying text.
343
Id.
344
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
345
See supra note 70.
346
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
347
Id.
341
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extraordinary circumstances, attorneys continue to prepare
348
Likewise,
documents and tangible things revealing trial strategy.
corporations will likely make disclosures to the government even
though the new privilege protecting those disclosures is a qualified
one.
Additionally, recognition of the corporation-government
privilege should be conditioned on the existence of a confidentiality
agreement between the government agency and the disclosing
corporation. The confidentiality agreement makes certain that the
government, in pursuit of the public interest, maintains control over
whether the corporation-government privilege should attach to the
349
disclosure.
In so doing, the government agency can restrict the
scope of the privilege, and ensure that the new privilege will only
become applicable when, in the opinion of the government agency,
the public interest in obtaining the disclosure outweighs other
350
concerns.
CONCLUSION
Although selective waiver does not advance the same values as
351
attorney-client, work-product, and self-evaluative privileges , it does
352
It serves to complement
advance other important public values.
353
existing methods of curtailing corporate criminal activity.
A
qualified corporation-government privilege, conditioned upon a
confidentiality agreement, will enhance cooperation with
government
investigations
by
corporations
suspected
of
354
wrongdoing.
This disclosure serves vital public interests by
facilitating the prosecution of white-collar criminals, thus decreasing
355
the likelihood of similar offenses occurring in the future.
Furthermore, this disclosure, facilitated by a new corporationgovernment privilege, will enable the government to conduct cost-

348

Id.
See Saito, 2002 WL 31657622, at *8 (observing that “[t]he SEC restricts its
grants of confidentiality agreements to situations where it has reason to believe that
obtaining work product is in the public interest and will result in greater efficiency in
the investigation.”).
350
See id.
351
See supra notes 264-292 and accompanying text.
352
See supra notes 224-229 and accompanying text.
353
See supra notes 224-229 and accompanying text.
354
See supra notes 345-350 and accompanying text.
355
See supra notes 224-229 and accompanying text.
349
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efficient investigations, resolve a higher quantity of investigations,
and require cooperating corporations to institute internal controls to
356
detect criminal wrongdoing within their midst.
Although a corporation-government privilege necessarily
inhibits post-disclosure private litigant discovery efforts, the current
regime, by granting private litigants access to corporate disclosures,
357
fails to provide sufficient incentives to foster voluntary disclosures.
The existing post-disclosure discovery burden chills corporate
cooperation with government investigations, thereby hindering law
358
enforcement efforts.
Corporations’ decreased willingness to make
such disclosures also reduces the availability of disclosed materials
359
currently discoverable by private litigants.
The selective waiver
doctrine, implemented in the form of a corporation-government
360
privilege, therefore provides substantial benefits at low cost.
The
only significant burden associated with the new privilege is that it
induces lawmakers and judges to abandon their fears of recognizing
361
new privileges.
Opponents have hoped that selective waiver would fade into the
annals of legal history, but the doctrine has survived in commentary
and in certain courts because it provides the proper incentives for
corporate cooperation with government investigations. Congress
should implement a selective waiver rule in the form of a new
privilege in order to obtain voluntary disclosures necessary to combat
criminal activity brewing within America’s corporations.
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